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CLASSIFYING FEDERAL TAXES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PURPOSES
Evgeny Magidenko

∗

In 2012, ruling on a challenge to President Obama’s landmark
healthcare legislation, the Supreme Court upheld the legislation’s
individual mandate penalty as a tax.1 The Court’s decision relied in
part on the finding that the penalty was not a direct tax and so its lack
of apportionment was not fatal.2 This was the first Supreme Court
case in decades to address direct taxes, but regrettably it provided
only a cursory examination of the subject. It did, however, serve as a
useful reminder that the constitutional analysis of taxes is not a
foregone conclusion and confirmed that there is a tenable distinction
between direct and indirect taxes.3
As the national government’s expenditures continue to outpace
revenues, calls for new forms of federal taxation to right the balance
will become more persistent.4
This pressure leads to the
understandable desire to test the outer limits of the federal
government’s taxation power, with creative minds finding new
methods of levying and collecting taxes never contemplated by the
Founding Fathers. To adequately assess the validity of any proposed
tax and fit it into the constitutional system, it is useful to have a
roadmap from which to proceed. This Article seeks to develop such
a model. As the examination that follows demonstrates, this is far
from straightforward; however, having categorized the tax in
question, it is often relatively simple to determine just what one can
and cannot do with it. This Article focuses on taxes that may be
∗
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See discussion infra Part IV.
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imposed by the federal government, so constitutional limits on the
powers of state taxation will not be addressed.5
The Article’s first part examines the text of the Constitution’s tax
clauses and the history behind them.6 The second part surveys the
Supreme Court cases interpreting these provisions.7 The third part
outlines a five-category model for classifying taxes for constitutional
purposes.8 The fourth and final part examines how this model applies
to selected taxes proposed in recent years.9
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S TAX PROVISIONS
A. The Text of the Direct (and “Indirect”) Tax Provisions
The best place to start any constitutional analysis is the text of the
United States Constitution, in which several clauses address taxation,
direct and otherwise.10 It is imperative to consider these provisions
together, as their interplay informs any attempt to create a model to
describe cogently the constitutional universe of taxation.
The basic constitutional provision authorizing the imposition of
taxes states simply: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”11 The term “taxes”
covers all possible levies. It “is generical, and was made use of to
vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation.”12 In
general, the taxing power has been understood broadly,13 though

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the implied “Dormant Commerce Clause”); id.
art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3.
See discussion infra Part I. The review will be brief, as others have already conducted
exhaustive historical analyses of these provisions. See, e.g., James R. Campbell,
Dispelling the Fog About Direct Taxation, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 109 (2012);
Charles J. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose, and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of the
Federal Constitution. I., 15 POL. SCI. Q. 217 (1900).
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.).
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992). But see Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing
Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1057, 1059 (2001) (challenging “the notion that the taxing power is plenary . . . the
specific limitations on the taxing power in the Constitution weren’t intended to be
trivial.”). The clause granting the taxing power reads fully: “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States[.]” U.S.
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modified by the structural restriction that an exaction must not be so
punitive as to violate due process.14 To properly execute its
functions, a government requires flexibility in raising revenue, and
this grant of a general taxation power provides just that. Almost any
revenue-raising measure can be called a tax.
Duties, imposts, and excises are a subset of taxes, commonly
referred to as indirect (by negative implication from the explicitly
mentioned direct taxes, discussed in the next paragraph), and are
subject to the Constitution’s Uniformity Clause: “all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”15 This
has generally been understood to require geographical uniformity
only.16 That is, the federal government must ensure that a tax does
not apply differently among the states; however, the incidence of the
tax may vary.17 For example, if the federal government levies an
excise on all hamburgers sold in the United States, the rate cannot
differ based on geography, but if hamburger consumption (or
production) varies in different parts of the country—as it surely
does—then the collections from those parts need not be uniform. The
Uniformity Clause extends only to the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and incorporated territories of the United States.18
Direct taxes, another subset of taxes, are subject to apportionment:
“[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken.”19 This requirement also appears in another clause: “[D]irect
Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The modifier means that the revenue collected must be used
for public purposes. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 450 (1905).
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes:” Are Consumption Taxes
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2340 (1997).
Id.
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that it did not violate
uniformity for Congress to impose duties on only Puerto Rican products after the
United States acquired the territory from Spain, as Puerto Rico was not incorporated
into the United States). An incorporated territory is one which Congress intends to
incorporate into the United States and make an integral part of the country. The only
incorporated territory held by the United States today is Palmyra Atoll, an archipelago
in the Pacific Ocean with no permanent population. American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and the
various other small possessions (predominantly islands scattered throughout the
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean) belonging to the United States are
unincorporated and outside the Uniformity Clause’s reach.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers. . .
.”20 The considerable debate on the nature and extent of direct
taxation notwithstanding,21 there is agreement on what apportionment
actually entails.22 If a tax is to be apportioned, each state must pay
proportionately to its number of residents as of the last census; thus,
if California has twelve percent of the United States’ population, then
it is responsible for paying twelve percent of the total tax imposed
across all the states.
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, removed the
apportionment requirement for income taxes: “[t]he Congress shall
have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”23 The curious
corollary issue here is that if certain income taxes are still considered
direct, then they are exempt from both the apportionment and
uniformity requirements; the Supreme Court’s approach to this
question has been ambiguous.24 In any case, the view of what
constitutes income has expanded over the past century, such that

20.

21.

22.
23.

24.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. There is a
question about the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment has modified the
apportionment requirement.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (1999) (“The question is . . . whether the repeal
of slavery should lead courts to construe [the ‘direct tax’ clauses’] meaning
narrowly.”); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 26 (1998) (“When slavery
ended, the historical rationale for the federal formula ended as well, but the formula
remained as an allocation by population, counting every individual as one, but devoid
of any remaining constitutional purpose.”). However, the apportionment requirement
appears in two different constitutional clauses, and the Fourteenth Amendment
modified only one of them. The best reading is that the apportionment requirement
remains unchanged, although reasonable minds may disagree.
Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses,
15 J.L. & POL. 687 (1999), responding to Ackerman, supra note 20, responding to
Jensen, supra note 16. “The phrase ‘direct taxes’ is confessedly blind,” and
“Alexander Hamilton warned . . . that we should search in vain for a settled legal
meaning.” Dwight W. Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REV.
379, 414 (1910).
Mark E. Berg, Determining Which Taxes Are Prohibited Direct Taxes After NFIB,
138 TAX NOTES 205, 205–06 (Jan. 14, 2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. For an excellent summation of the back-and-forth
surrounding the Amendment’s ratification, as well as the history of the direct tax
provisions generally, see Morrow, supra note 21, at 385–98.
See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 14, 18–19 (1916) (discussing
whether a tax on income should be subject to the requirements of apportionment and
uniformity).
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today the Supreme Court generally defers to the views of Congress
and the Treasury Department in analyzing what is income.25
The constitutional prohibition against taxes on exports also bears
brief mention: “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported
from any State.”26 This provision bans not only taxes falling squarely
on exports, but also some that indirectly burden those exports.27
B. A Brief History of the Constitution’s Tax Provisions
In examining constitutional provisions, in addition to the text of the
Constitution itself, history too may be helpful to consider.28 The men
who wrote our organic law were informed by the events and passions
of their time. To better appreciate the context in which the
Constitution’s tax provisions arose, it is necessary to detour briefly
and survey their origin.29
Having declared independence from Great Britain in 1776, the
American colonies had to devise a system to jointly raise revenue.
Keeping with the decentralized nature of the Articles of
Confederation, their primary revenue mechanism became that of
requisitions, where the central government would total its expenses
for a given fiscal cycle and then request the funds from the states.30
After much haggling over the method of apportionment, it was
decided that each state would contribute to the central treasury
proportionately to the value of the land and improvements located
within that state.31 The states were left to their own devices about
25.
26.

27.

28.

29.

30.
31.

Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 21.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. For a good summary of the Export Clause, see ERIKA K.
LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42780, EXPORT CLAUSE: LIMITATION ON
CONGRESS’S TAXING POWER (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42780.pdf.
See United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 846 (1996) (“We have had
few occasions to interpret the language of the Export Clause, but our cases have
broadly exempted from federal taxation not only export goods, but also services and
activities closely related to the export process.”).
Professor Edwin Seligman’s magisterial work on the history of the income tax is an
excellent resource. See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD (2d
ed. 1914).
The Sixteenth Amendment’s history will be omitted, for it arose simply as a rejection
of a turn-of-the-century Court decision. See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 5 (“Pollock .
. . was finally repudiated by the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.”); Jensen, supra note
16, at 2343 (“The invalidation of the late-nineteenth-century income tax led, more or
less directly, to the Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913[.]”).
Bullock, supra note 6, at 218.
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income
Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 912 (2000).
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how to raise the money, leading to considerable divergence in tax
collection regimes.32 The requisitions method was theoretically
sound, but its enforcement was an entirely different matter. The
Confederation government “lacked both the political will to collect
unpaid moneys from delinquent states and the coercive power to
force states to comply.”33 States took full advantage of this
weakness, and the collections rate overall amounted to a paltry thirtyseven percent of the entire amount requisitioned during the
Confederation government’s existence.34
In light of the chronic failure of the central Confederation
government to raise revenue, calls for a wholesale amendment to the
Articles arose, culminating in what became the Constitutional
Convention of 1787.35 At the Convention, delegates spent much time
debating the scope of the central government’s power.36 It was
ultimately agreed that the general power of taxation should be
defined broadly and include the ability to levy “taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises”—all the common names of taxes then known.37
The prohibition on export taxes was auspicious. The natural
benefits to a manufacturing economy aside, the South was concerned
that any taxes on exports would more seriously injure the Southern
states’ economies than those of the North—that the value of slaves
“might be decreased by export duties on the peculiar products of
slave labor.”38 Massachusetts and Connecticut agreed, more because
their economies relied on shipping than on any particular concerns
over slavery.39 A related provision is the uniformity requirement for
duties, imposts, and excises, motivated by the concerns of several
states that the central government might favor the ports of certain
states over others.40
The origin of the direct tax clauses was more complex than that of
the rest and linked to the intractable question of slavery.41 One of the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 913–14.
See id. at 915–16.
See id. at 916–17 (discussing debates among the delegates regarding the proposed
methods through which the central government would collect taxes from the states).
Bullock, supra note 6, at 222–23.
Id. at 225–26.
RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 319 (1st ed. 2009); Bullock, supra note 6, at 226.
Bullock, supra note 6, at 227.
Id. at 230. Some commentators, however, dispute that the direct tax clauses had their
genesis in the slavery question. E.g., Arthur C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the
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major obstacles facing the convention was how to proportion
representation of states in the federal government. States with
sizeable slave populations wanted all slaves counted for purposes of
representation, whereas free states urged the opposite, contending
that no slaves should be counted in determining representation.42 The
delegates deadlocked as proposal after proposal was defeated.43 The
watershed moment came when Gouverneur Morris proposed that
taxation be in proportion to representation, thereby reducing both the
South’s incentive to count all slaves and the North’s opposition to
admitting some form of additional representation on the basis of slave
populations.44 Addressing the criticism that this would represent a
return to requisitions, Morris suggested that apportionment be limited
to direct taxes, which he understood to be those taxes other than on
exports, imports, and consumption.45 The motion was passed
unanimously and became the direct tax clause in Article I, section 2.46
The history of the other direct tax clause, in Article I, section 9,
referring explicitly to apportionment per the results of a census, is
even more curious. The South was concerned that until the first
census was conducted, the federal government might conduct an
arbitrary population estimate and put an undue burden on slave
states.47 It was therefore proposed to limit capitation taxes until the
census could be carried out.48 This proposal was adopted, with a later
amendment under which the restriction on capitation taxes was
extended to all taxes, apparently to prevent readjustments of states’
burdens under past requisitions of the Confederation government.49
II. CASES INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION’S TAX
PROVISIONS
The Supreme Court has provided a considerable body of
jurisprudence interpreting the Constitution’s tax clauses, with the

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Income Tax Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 19 YALE L.J. 505, 510–11, 513–
14 (1910).
See Bullock, supra note 6, at 232–34.
See id. at 232–33.
Id. at 233–34. It has been suggested that “[a]pportionment by population was treated
in the debates as merely a measure of wealth when no other measure was feasible.”
Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of
Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 303 (2004).
Bullock, supra note 6, at 234.
Id. at 234, 237.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238–39.
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bulk dating from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the
judicial furor over the Sixteenth Amendment settled by the 1930s, tax
clause challenges became less frequent. From the 1990s on, there has
been a mild revival of interest in constitutional tax issues, though
little attention is devoted to them outside of a small niche in
academia.50 This Article’s conclusions rely on a close examination of
the Supreme Court’s case law—and its evolution through time—
interpreting the Constitution’s direct and indirect tax provisions and
several corollary issues. The survey is split into four sections: the
first addresses cases interpreting the direct tax provisions before the
Sixteenth Amendment51; the second, as a continuation of the first,
reviews those cases that follow the Amendment’s ratification;52 the
third and fourth look to cases examining the Uniformity and Export
Clauses, respectively.53
Hopefully, future scholars will benefit from this chronological
overview of constitutional common law. The most important cases
are discussed individually in the text, each beginning with a short
summation of its holding. The curious reader can find many
additional cases in the footnotes. The reader short on time may
decide, at least initially, to skip the detailed survey of cases and go
directly to the summary at the end of this Part II,54 before continuing
on to Part III, which proposes a constitutional model for classifying
taxes,55 and Part IV, which applies that model to several types of
taxes that have been proposed—and might be considered in the
future—to address the continuing national revenue gap.56 The author
hopes that such a reader will then return to this case survey in order
to more fully understand the Supreme Court decisions that form the
basis of the constitutional model proposed below.
A. Cases Interpreting the Direct Tax Clauses
The constitutional rule for direct taxes states that such levies must
be apportioned based on population.57
Notwithstanding the
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Erik M. Jensen, Post-NFIB: Does the Taxing Clause Give Congress Unlimited
Power?, 136 TAX NOTES 1309, 1314 (Sept. 10, 2012) (“For the three of us in the
world who care about the direct-tax apportionment rule . . . .”).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Parts II.C, II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).
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conceptual simplicity of the apportionment requirement, the Court
has long struggled to define what types of taxes are in fact subject to
it.58 The Founding Fathers did not have a monolithic definition of
direct taxes in their minds when they were drafting the Constitution.59
As history has shown, an ambiguous constitutional provision is often
the fountainhead of endless court challenges, which has been the
situation with direct taxes, as the following cases demonstrate.
Hylton v. United States – 1796
Holding: an annual tax on carriages is a duty.60 Justice
Chase concludes that direct taxes encompass capitations and
taxes on land.61 Justice Paterson finds that direct taxes also
include general personal property assessments.62
The best place to start the survey is from the beginning. Hylton
was the first case to interpret direct taxes and is notable for its time
period and the men involved, such as Alexander Hamilton, who
argued on behalf of the United States.63 The case was decided in
1796, when George Washington was still president, and the
Constitutional Convention a recent memory. Three of the four
justices who heard the case had been delegates to the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention.64 And although their decision is not
beyond challenge,65 it is an important Founding-era judicial
interpretation on this question.
At issue in Hylton was whether an annual tax on carriages was
direct, which would require that it be apportioned.66 The Court
delivered its opinion seriatim, as was the custom at the time, inherited
from the British appellate courts. The justices held unanimously that
the tax was indirect.67
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Campbell, supra note 6, at 111.
See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 4 (“[T]he Founders didn’t have a very clear sense of
what they were doing in carving out a distinct category of ‘direct’ taxes for special
treatment.”).
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
Id.
Id. at 176–77 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
J.H. Riddle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of a Direct Tax, 15 MICH. L. REV. 566, 567
(1917).
Those were Justices Wilson, Paterson, and Chase. Ackerman, supra note 20, at 21.
See id. at 22 (“Chase and Iredell were strong nationalists, and so their opinions
upholding a uniform national tax might not be too surprising.”).
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 172–73 (opinion of Chase, J.).
Id. at 172–84.
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Justice Chase, first to deliver his opinion, identified several types of
taxes for constitutional purposes: direct taxes subject to
apportionment; duties, imposts, and excises subject to uniformity;
and taxes that are neither direct, nor duties, imposts, or excises, and
thus subject to neither restriction.68 He posited that there might also
be a tax simultaneously direct and indirect, although he could offer
no examples of such a tax.69 He considered rhetorically: “[W]ould
Congress be prohibited from laying such a tax, because it is partly a
direct tax?”70 Answering in the negative, he observed that such a tax
would be deemed entirely indirect: “The Constitution evidently
contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as Congress
could lay in proportion to the census.”71 It would be inequitable for
states of like population but different numbers of carriages to be
apportioned an equal tax burden, such that the per-carriage incidence
of the tax would vary among the states.
Chase concluded that an annual tax on carriages is properly
classified as a duty, which he understood to include such items as
stamp taxes, passage tolls, and numerous others.72 An annual
carriage tax is a tax on a “consumable commodity,” a tax that is
indirect and on the owner’s expense.73 Chase then reasoned in dicta
“that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two,
to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property,
profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on LAND.”74 He
doubted whether “a general assessment of personal property, within
the United States, is included within the term direct tax.”75 With
direct taxes including only capitations and taxes on realty, the
carriage tax could be nothing but indirect.
Justice Paterson, next to deliver his opinion, observed that,
although the case hinges on definitions, there is no clear
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

Id. at 172–74 (opinion of Chase, J.).
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. What Justice Chase means here by a “consumeable commodity” is unclear. John
Locke understood “consumable commodities” to be those capable of being
consumed—what are today known as consumables. Carriages, however, are durable
goods. Chase perhaps intended that carriages were goods that depreciated with time,
such that they were eventually “consumed,” and indeed the passage from Adam Smith
quoted by Justice Paterson later suggests that consumable commodities include both
durable (i.e., capital) and consumable goods. Id. at 180–81 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
Id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.).
Id.
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understanding of the meanings of “duty” and “excise.”76 The
Founding Fathers intended that Congress “should possess full power
over every species of taxable property, except exports.”77 The term
“taxes” in the Constitution is generic, describing all levies that could
conceivably be enacted, vesting in Congress a plenary taxation
authority.78 Taxes can be divided into direct (explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution) and indirect (inferred from the Constitution by
negative implication) varieties. Duties, imposts, and excises are
indirect and subject to uniformity.79 Paterson speculated that there
might exist an indirect tax that is neither a duty nor an impost or
excise.80 He suggested that such a tax should still be uniform but did
not elaborate further.81 As to direct taxes, the Constitution describes
capitations as direct, and Paterson observed that taxes on land are
also deemed to be direct, both theoretically and practically.82 It was
unclear whether taxes on the product of land were to be deemed
direct or indirect, but the question was not at issue in Hylton, so
Paterson noted it but did not examine it further.83 He did observe,
disagreeing on this point with Chase, that if Congress were to enact
an aggregate tax on “things that generally pervade all the states in the
Union,” then that tax might be considered direct.84
Paterson next stated that the rule of apportionment should not be
extended by construction, as it was the product of compromise and
otherwise “radically wrong,” not to “be supported by any solid
reasoning,” because it treated slaves as a type of property represented
more than other property.85 Moreover, a system relying heavily on
apportionment would effectively constitute a return to the old
requisitions scheme of the Articles of Confederation.86
Apportionment would also result in similarly situated individuals in
different states potentially paying different sums, leading to
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“What is the natural and common, or technical and
appropriate, meaning of the words, duty and excise, it is not easy to ascertain. They
present no clear and precise idea to the mind. Different persons will annex different
significations to the terms.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 177–178.
See id. at 178; supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
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uncertainty and undue administrative burdens for the states. The
Uniformity Clause was a simpler and more equitable rule.87 Paterson
observed that apportionment is an operation on the states, involving
arbitrary valuations and assessments, whereas uniformity is “an
instant operation on individuals,” involving no intervening
assessments.88 He concluded by observing that taxes on expenses and
consumption are indirect, as they are “circuitous modes of reaching
the revenue of individuals, who generally live according to their
income.”89 Since a tax on carriages is a tax on expenses or
consumption, it is indirect and not subject to apportionment.
Justice Iredell authored the third and final substantive opinion in
Hylton, disagreeing with the reasoning of both Chase and Paterson.
Iredell affirmed that Congress has the plenary power to tax all taxable
objects, excepting exports, subject to apportionment for direct taxes
and uniformity for duties, imposts, and excises.90 He also noted that
if an indirect tax is not a duty, impost, or excise, then it should still be
subject to uniformity.91
On the main question, Iredell argued that, “[a]s all direct taxes must
be apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none
as direct but such as could be apportioned.”92 If a tax cannot be
apportioned, then it is not a direct tax for constitutional purposes.
Apportioning something like the carriage tax would lead to absurd
results, with identical articles taxed at different rates in different
states.93 If the incidence of a carriage tax were passed on to carriage
owners, then between two states of comparable population, the one
with the larger number of carriages would have a lower tax per
capita.94 Alternative proposals for apportioning such a tax were also
unworkable.95 In any case, a direct tax was one on “something
inseparably annexed to the soil,” such as a land or poll tax.96
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180. See also supra text accompanying notes 15–18
(explaining the Constitution’s Uniformity Clause).
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
Id.
Id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
Id. Justice Iredell’s reasoning on this point is not clear; he likely thought it contrary to
the spirit of the Constitution to levy non-geographically uniform taxes on individuals.
Id. at 181–83.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 182–83.
Id. at 183. See also Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Oy Yes, the Healthcare Penalty
is Unconstitutional, 129 TAX NOTES 725, 727–28 (Nov. 8, 2010) (examining critically
whether Justice Iredell said what he meant in Hylton).
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Loughborough v. Blake – 1820
Holding: Congress may impose a direct tax on the District
of Columbia or a territory, although it is not obligated to do
so when it imposes such a tax on the states.97 If a direct tax
is imposed on the District or territories, however, it must
follow the rule of apportionment.98
Although often ignored in discussions about direct taxation,
Loughborough is nonetheless worthy of brief mention. At issue was
whether Congress could impose a direct tax on the District of
Columbia and by extension other American territories not
incorporated as states.99
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, observed
that Congress has a general power to levy taxes without geographical
restriction.100
The Uniformity Clause requires uniformity
“throughout the United States[,]” meaning that indirect taxes must be
imposed in a like manner everywhere within the United States,
including the District and territories.101 Since the power to lay direct
taxes is coterminous with indirect taxes (though the mode of exercise
is different), Congress has the power to impose direct taxes anywhere
in the United States, including the District and other territories.102
The exercise of the power of direct taxation is problematic as
applied to the District and Territories, however, since the
apportionment of direct taxes is governed by the results of a census,
which is required to count only the population of the states and not
the federal District.103 But when the census was conducted, the
population of the District and the Territories could just as easily be
counted in the same manner.104 And, although Congress cannot
exempt any state from its apportioned direct tax burden, the terms of
the Constitution addressing direct taxation confine this limitation to
the states.105 Therefore, if Congress lays a direct tax, that tax must
apply to all states, but Congress may choose whether to apply it to the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 325 (1820).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 318–19.
Id.
Id. at 318–19 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 319–22.
Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 323.
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District and territories.106 If Congress does elect to impose a direct
tax in the District or Territories, it must be apportioned, for just as the
uniformity requirement “secures the district from oppression in the
imposition of indirect taxes,” the principle of apportionment secures
“the district from any oppressive exercise of the power to lay and
collect direct taxes.”107
Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule – 1868
Holding: a tax on the gross income of insurance companies
is a duty or excise.108 Duties are things due and recoverable
by law.109 Imposts are duties on imports.110 And excises are
domestic taxes on the consumption of commodities or retail
sales.111
Following Loughborough, the Supreme Court remained silent on
direct taxation questions for nearly 50 years until Pacific Insurance
Company, a challenge to a wide-ranging internal revenue act enacted
during the Civil War, which levied, among other exactions, a tax on
the gross receipts of certain insurance companies.112
Justice Swayne, writing for the Court, looked to Hylton for the
proposition “that the [only] direct taxes contemplated by the

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 325.
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 434, 445 (1868).
Id. at 445 (citing 2 T.E. TOMLINS, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE,
PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW; DEFINING AND INTERPRETING
THE TERMS OR WORDS OF ART; AND COMPRISING COPIOUS INFORMATION ON THE
SUBJECTS OF LAW, TRADE, AND GOVERNMENT 330 (Philadelphia & New York, P.
Byrne & I. Riley 1811)).
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing 1 JOSEPH BATEMAN, THE LAWS OF EXCISE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
EXISTING STATUTES RELATING TO THE REVENUE OF EXCISE; WITH PRACTICAL NOTES
AND FORMS, AND AN APPENDIX OF SELECT CASES 9 (London, A. Maxwell & Son
1843); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 953 (The
Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2d ed. 2009); 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 318 (Geo. T. Bisel Co. 1922); 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAW, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 242 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803)).
112. Id. at 434.
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Constitution” were capitations and taxes on land.113 However,
dissatisfied with a cursory conclusion, he dissected the species of
indirect taxes listed in the Uniformity Clause. Citing Tomlin’s Law
Dictionary, he defined duties as “things due and recoverable by
law[,]” a definition broad enough to cover most taxes.114 A narrower
meaning was sometimes imparted to duties, defining them as
customs, and therefore synonymous with imposts.115 Justice Swayne
defined imposts as duties on imported goods and merchandise,
looking to James Madison, who had considered duties and imposts
synonymous for constitutional purposes.116 A possible alternative
view was that imposts cover every type of tax not deemed a “tax” or
“excise.”117 Finally, according to Justice Swayne and the majority, an
excise is “an inland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of
the commodity, and sometimes upon the retail sale; sometimes upon
the manufacturer, and sometimes upon the vendor.”118
With the exception of the apportionment and uniformity
restrictions, as well as the ban on export taxes, “the exercise of the
[taxing] power is, in all respects, unfettered.”119 If a tax on carriages
held for private use was not direct, then a tax on the business of
insurance companies could not be direct either.120 Apportioning the
insurance company tax would be inequitable, as the burden would
fall lightly in those states with many and wealthy corporations, not at
all in those with no insurance companies, and most heavily in those
with few and poor corporations.121 Justice Swayne argued that “[i]t
cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended that
any tax should be apportioned, the collection of which on that
principle would be attended with such results.”122 The insurance
company revenue tax therefore could be nothing but a duty or
excise—indirect and not subject to apportionment.

113. Id. at 444–45 (quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796)
(opinion of Chase, J.)).
114. Id. at 445 (citing TOMLINS, supra note 109, at 330).
115. Id. (citing TOMLINS, supra note 109, at 330; STORY, supra note 111, at § 952; Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Veazie Bank v. Fenno – 1869
Holding: a tax on state bank note circulation is a duty.123
Affirming Justice Paterson’s view in Hylton that direct taxes
are capitations, taxes on land, and general personal property
assessments.124
A year after deciding Pacific Insurance Company, the Supreme
Court again took up the issue of direct taxation in Veazie Bank v.
Fenno. At issue was the constitutionality of a federal tax on the
circulation of notes and bills issued by entities other than national
banking associations, imposed to discourage state-issued notes.125
Chief Justice Chase (not the same Chase as in Hylton), writing for
the Court, noted the difficulty of accurately defining the terms used in
the Constitution to describe the congressional taxing power.126 The
general intent of the Constitutional Convention was to create a strong
federal taxing power, encompassing the taxation of everything but
exports, with “certain virtual limitations, arising from the principles
of the Constitution itself[,]” primarily that the federal government
cannot tax “to impair the separate existence and independent selfgovernment of the States,” nor can it tax to achieve “ends
inconsistent with the limited grants of power in the Constitution.”127
To this end, the uniformity and apportionment requirements were not
restrictions but directions on the mode of exercising the taxing
power.128
Chase dismissed political economists’ definitions of direct taxes as
irrelevant to the constitutional understanding of the term and turned
instead to the historical evidence of how Congress understood direct
taxes when it legislated apportioned taxes.129 Through 1869, there
were five instances of Congress levying apportioned taxes, with each
instance a one-time gross levy apportioned among the states based on
population.130 In these instances, Congress consistently limited direct

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869).
Id. at 544–46.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 540–41.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 541–42.
Bullock, supra note 6, at 470–74 (1900). The 1815 and 1861 levies had been made
annual but were later repealed and suspended, respectively, such that they were in
effect for only one year. Either way, the levies appear to have been ineffective at
raising revenue. Id.
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taxes to those on land, appurtenances, and capitation.131
Contrariwise, “personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like,
have never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct
tax.”132 Chief Justice Chase concluded that this practical construction
by Congress was entitled to considerable deference, especially in the
absence of any contrary evidence in the discussions of the
Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions.133
Chief Justice Chase thus affirmed Hylton, holding that direct taxes
are: (1) capitation taxes, (2) taxes on land, and (3) possibly taxes on
all personal property by general valuation.134 All other taxes are
indirect—duties, imposts, and excises—and subject to the rule of
geographical uniformity.135 The tax on bank note circulation most
closely fits the category of duty, similarly to the tax on insurance
company income analyzed by the Court the prior year in Pacific
Insurance Company.136
Scholey v. Rew – 1874
Holding: an inheritance tax is an excise or duty.137
Occupational and license fees may be a form of indirect tax,
separate from duties, imposts, and excises.138
Several years after Veazie Bank, the Supreme Court again
confronted the direct tax question in Scholey, where at issue was a tax
applicable when a person became beneficially entitled to real estate
or income from real estate upon the death of a decedent.139

131. Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 542–43. In 1798 ($2 million), 1813 ($3 million),
1815 ($6 million), and 1816 ($3 million), the tax was levied upon lands,
improvements, dwelling-houses, and slaves. Id. In 1861, a $20 million tax was levied
upon lands, improvements, and dwelling-houses only. Id. The 1798 tax treated the
slave component as a capitation, while the remainder of the Antebellum taxes treated
slaves as a part of realty. Id. at 543.
132. Id. at 543.
133. Id. at 544.
134. Id. at 546. The Court here evidently favored Justice Paterson’s view of a broadly
based personal property tax as a direct tax, over that of Chase. See supra text
accompanying notes 75, 84.
135. Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 546.
136. Id. at 546–47.
137. Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 346–47 (1874).
138. Id. at 348.
139. Id. at 346.
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Justice Clifford, writing for the Court, determined that the tax was
an excise or duty and thus indirect.140 Although he affirmed the
Hylton Court’s land tax–or–capitation definition of a direct tax, he
reasoned that the exaction was not a tax on land but a tax on the
transfer of land.141 The tax only applied when the successor’s interest
in real estate vested upon the death of a predecessor.142 “[I]n other
words,” he opined, “it is the right to become the successor of real
estate upon the death of the predecessor” that triggers the tax.143
Justice Clifford observed that it was not necessary to determine
whether a direct tax included exactions other than taxes on land or
capitations.144 However, “it is expressly decided that the term does
not include the tax on income, which cannot be distinguished in
principle from a succession tax. . . .”145 In other words, an inheritance
tax is in principle similar to an income tax, which had been found
indirect in Pacific Insurance Company. Justice Clifford also noted
that the government could draw revenue from:
[Exactions in] the form of duties, imposts, or excises, or
they may also assume the form of license fees for
permission to carry on particular occupations or to enjoy
special franchises, or they may be specific in form, as when
levied upon corporations in reference to the amount of
capital stock or to the business done or profits earned by the
individual or corporation.146

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 346–47.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 348. Contra United States v. Vassar (License Tax Cases) 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462,
471 (1886) (stating that a license grant “must be regarded as nothing more than a mere
form of imposing a tax”). Under Justice Clifford’s definition, none of the exactions
listed would qualify as a direct tax, so he must be suggesting that license fees, capital
stock levies, and income taxes are indirect. This of course raises the question of
whether these exactions are to be understood as separate from duties, imposts, and
excises, in which case they would be exempt from the uniformity requirement.
Pacific Insurance Co. determined that corporate income taxes are duties or excises,
and Justice Clifford here invoked the same reasoning. See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 445 (1868). Almost certainly he understood capital stock levies
and income taxes to fall under the umbrella of duties, imposts, and excises. On the
other hand, he seemed to indicate fairly explicitly (exactions “may also assume the
form of license fees . . . .”) that occupational and franchise license fees would be a
category in addition to duties, imposts, and excises. He does not offer any further
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Springer v. United States – 1881
Holding: an income tax is an excise or duty.147
Justice Swayne, delivering the Court’s unanimous opinion,
examined in Springer whether a Civil War-era tax on income, gains,
and profits was direct.148 He began his analysis with the history of
the direct tax provisions, relating the almost serendipitous way in
which Gouverneur Morris’s suggestion for a direct tax limitation was
incorporated as part of a compromise on representation in the
Constitutional Convention.149 Swayne also looked to Alexander
Hamilton’s thoughts in Federalist Papers No. 21 and 36, in which
Hamilton had written that direct taxes are principally those on real
property and capitations.150 Hamilton argued similarly in his briefs
for Hylton, although he also added to direct taxes the category of
general assessments (taxes levied on the whole property of
individuals or upon their entire real or personal estate).151 Levied
only on a part of a taxpayer’s personal estate, the income tax at issue
could not be a general assessment and did not fall into any of the
other direct tax categories.152
Examining the taxes that Congress treated as direct, Justice Swayne
found, as the Court did in Veazie Bank, that the only direct taxes
imposed by Congress and identified as such had been on real estate
and slaves.153 He affirmed that such a “uniform practical construction
of the Constitution touching so important a point, through so long a
period, by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, though not conclusive, is a consideration of great
weight.”154 Looking to Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of
direct taxation, he found like interpretations, with contemporary
treatises on constitutional law and taxation offering no dissent.155

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

explanation, and this ambiguity is likely a case of careless drafting. Scholey, 90 U.S.
at 348.
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880).
Id. at 592.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 597–98.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 598–99; see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 542–43 (1869).
Springer, 102 U.S. at 599.
Id. at 602. Justice Story, cited by Justice Swayne here, had posited that direct taxes
include taxes on land or real property, and that indirect taxes include taxes on
consumption. Id. (citing STORY, supra note 111, at § 950).
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Accordingly, “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution,
are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes
on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error
complains is within the category of an excise or duty.”156
Pollock I – 1895
Holding: a tax on rents or other income from real estate is
direct.157
Following Springer, slightly more than a decade had passed before
the Supreme Court again heard a case on direct taxation. That case,
Pollock, represented such a watershed moment that it is typical to
divide direct tax jurisprudence into pre- and post-Pollock eras.158 In
Pollock, a broadly based income tax was challenged on the grounds
that, by taxing the income or rents of real estate, the law taxed the
real estate itself.159 Likewise, by taxing the interest or other income
from bonds and other income-producing personal property, the law
taxed directly the personal estate itself.160
Chief Justice Fuller, delivering the Court’s opinion, observed that
the Founding Fathers, in writing the Constitution, “had just emerged
from the struggle for independence whose rallying cry had been that
‘taxation and representation go together.’”161 After an examination of
the federal system of government and the constitutional system of
taxation, Fuller noted in passing that if there were an indirect tax that
was not a duty, impost, or excise, then it had remained undiscovered
“for more than one hundred years of national existence,” expressing
skepticism but not outright dismissal of the idea.162

156. Id.
157. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 580–81, vacated, 158
U.S. 601 (1895). See also Hyde v. Cont’l Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 654 (1895) (incorporating
by reference the opinion, concurrence, and dissents from Pollock I). There are in fact
two Pollock opinions, issued within months of each other. The first decision found
the justices of the Supreme Court deadlocked at 4–4 on several key issues, which led
the Court to rehear the case a month later. Although the two Pollock cases are often
taken together, for the sake of chronology, they are treated separately here.
158. E.g., Jensen, supra note 16, at 2350. The Pollock I case had overtones of what today
would be called ‘class conflict,’ animated as the debate was in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries by the rise of socialism and communism. See Sheldon D. Pollack,
Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894-1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 301–06 (2013).
159. Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 431–32.
160. See id. at 432–33.
161. Id. at 555–56.
162. Id. at 557.
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On the direct tax question, Fuller stated that indirect taxes
economically are those which can be shifted to another person or
avoided, while direct taxes are taxes on one’s real or personal estate
or the income therefrom that cannot be avoided.163 However,
acknowledging that the constitutional definition may be different, he
examined the Founding Fathers’ understanding of direct taxes.164
Fuller ultimately concurred with Albert Gallatin’s assessment from
1796 that “[t]he most generally received opinion . . . is, that by direct
taxes in the constitution, those are meant which are raised on the
capital or revenue of the peop[le]; by indirect, such as are raised on
their expense.”165 The justices in Hylton had expressed doubt about
whether a direct tax included anything beyond a capitation or a land
tax, but avoided expressly deciding the question.166 Moreover,
British law had always classified income taxes as direct, and the
expectation was that direct taxation would be levied only in exigent
circumstances, which had held true until the 1894 income tax.167 All
the direct taxation cases following Hylton had conceded that taxes on
land are direct, and none had determined that rents or income derived
from land are not taxes on land.168 Citing the common law principle
that land is nothing but the profits that may be derived therefrom,
Fuller held that “[a]n annual tax upon the annual value or annual user
of real estate[,]” which is without question a direct tax, “appears to us
the same in substance as an annual tax on the real estate, which
would be paid out of the rent or income.”169 As substance controls
and not form, the income tax law, insofar as it levied “a tax on the
rents or income of real estate,” violated the Constitution.170 The
Court was evenly split on the severability of constitutional provisions
from those held unconstitutional,171 a deadlock that paved the way to
a rehearing and second opinion in Pollock II a month later.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 558.
See generally id. at 558–70.
Id. at 569.
See id. at 571–72.
Id. at 572–74.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 586.
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Pollock II – 1895
Holding: a tax on real or personal property, or a tax on the
income from such, is direct.172 Duties are taxes on the
import, export, or consumption of goods. Imposts are
indirect taxes generally. Excises are taxes on goods or
licenses.173
After a rehearing and change of opinion by one of the justices, the
Court issued a second opinion in Pollock, also written by Chief
Justice Fuller, which again was met with vigorous dissents from four
justices. The goal of the rehearing was to address the arguments on
which the Court initially had been evenly split.174 Pointing out that
the Court’s previous “conclusions remained unchanged,” Fuller noted
that, just like a person’s income derived from rents or products of real
property is direct, so too is income derived from personal property,
including bonds, stocks, and other such forms, finding support in the
natural meaning of the words used to delineate the constitutional
taxation powers and the historical circumstances surrounding the
Constitutional Convention.175 Fuller asserted that the limitation on
direct taxes was designed to constrain the taxation power, delegated
as it was by the states to the federal government.176 It could not be
that direct taxation was “restricted in one breath, and the restriction
blown to the winds in another.”177
Fuller relied on the commentary of several legal experts to derive
definitions of the various types of indirect taxes. Looking to
Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional Treatise, he
observed that a “duty” is a tax imposed on the import, export, “or
consumption of goods;” a “custom” is a duty on imports or exports
only; an “impost” can be any tax, tribute, or duty, although it is
generally applied to indirect taxes only;178 and an “excise” is an
inland impost on goods and “licenses to pursue certain trades or to
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
Id.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 617–19.
Id. at 621 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819)).
Id. at 622.
Id. This definition of impost differs from that advanced in an earlier case, where the
issue arose in the context of the constitutional prohibition on state taxation of imports
and exports. There, “impost, or duty on imports,” was defined as “a custom or a tax
levied on articles brought into a country,” which could be levied either before or after
“the importer is allowed to exercise his rights of ownership over [the goods
imported.]” Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 437 (1827).
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deal” in commodities.179 Fuller also looked approvingly to Justice
Story’s view that “duties” in the Constitution are used equivalently to
“customs” and “imposts.”180
Fuller stated that Hylton was “badly reported,” omitting certain key
reasoning, such as that the case turned not on the issue of direct
taxation specifically but whether the carriage tax was an excise.181 It
had not been stated explicitly in Hylton, but Hamilton had argued in
that case that a general assessment, be it upon an individual’s entire
property or real or personal estate, is also a direct tax.182 Thus, “a
general unapportioned tax, imposed upon all property owners as a
body for or in respect of their property,” must be direct.183
Just as the income from real property cannot be regarded in
isolation, neither can the income from personal property.184 It was
not dispositive on the issue that Congress had not included personal
property in its prior apportioned taxes.185 Income, once generated,
may be severed from the property from whence it came, but it cannot
be taxed where the source cannot be.186 If there is no power to tax
real and personal property without apportionment, the same
restriction ought to apply to the income generated therefrom.187 In
England, the income tax had always been regarded as direct.188 Even
assuming that an income tax was not contemplated by the Founding
Fathers, which is unlikely,189 it cannot be taken out of the
constitutional rule. Although an income tax levy may give rise to
inconveniences, it can be apportioned, even if that apportionment
may operate unequally.190 In a challenge that would ultimately be
met within twenty years, Fuller noted that the Constitution allows for
179.
180.
181.
182.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

190.

Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 622.
Id. (citing STORY, supra note 111, at § 952).
Id. at 626–27.
Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429, 572 (quoting 7 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 332 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1886)), vacated, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id. at 630.
Id.
The first general income tax was introduced in England in 1799, more than a decade
after American independence, although some partial forms of income taxes were
known to exist much earlier. Indeed, at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, taxes
were levied in many states on incomes from professions, business, and employment.
Id. at 630–32.
Id. at 633.
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amendment, and if the desire is strong to tax income from real and
personal property without apportionment, that route is available.191
Holding that a tax on income arising from both real and personal
property (as with a tax on the real and personal property itself) is
direct, Fuller turned to severability.192 Gains and profits from
business, privileges, and employment had always been deemed to be
excises, and there was no reason to doubt that interpretation.193
However, with the income tax stricken out of the law as it applied to
income from real and personal property, the largest portion of the
anticipated revenue was eliminated.194 This left “the burden of the
tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations;
and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain,
in substance, a tax on occupations and labor.”195 Since the law
imposed the income tax in a single scheme of taxation, and because
of the severe burdens that would be imposed if parts of the income
tax were left to stand, Fuller determined that the entire income tax
must be stricken.196
Nicol v. Ames – 1899
Holding: a stamp tax on sales at exchanges is a duty or
excise, and it is uniform, because it applies equally to all
users of exchange facilities without regard to geography.197
A general sales tax, however, would be a direct tax on
property.198
Several years after Pollock, the Court again confronted the
definition of a direct tax in Nicol, where it addressed the
constitutionality of a stamp tax levied on sales of merchandise at
exchanges and boards of trade.199 Justice Peckham, writing for the
Court, observed that in analyzing a tax’s validity, it is the tax’s
practical effect that is most important, rather than “the purely

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 637.
Id. For an article by a contemporary reflecting on the injustices of apportionment and
criticizing the expanded Pollock definition of direct taxes, see Bullock, supra note 6,
at 465–81.
Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 637.
Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 519–21 (1899).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 514.
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economic or theoretical nature of the tax.”200 The primary argument
against the stamp tax in question was that it was a tax on the sale of
property measured by the value of the thing sold, making it a direct
tax upon the property itself.201 Peckham held that the tax was not
“upon the business itself which is so transacted,” but rather “a duty
upon the facilities made use of, and actually employed, in the
transaction of the business, and separate and apart from the business
itself.”202 The purpose was to exact a levy for the privilege of doing
business at exchanges and boards of trade.203 The fact that it was not
capable of being shifted was irrelevant, since the tax was an indirect
duty or excise.204 However, “[a] tax upon the privilege of selling
property at the exchange, and of thus using the facilities there offered
in accomplishing the sale, differs radically from a tax upon every sale
made in any place. The latter tax is really and practically upon
property.”205 Peckham dismissed allegations that the tax was not
uniform, concluding that it was valid under any possible definition of
uniformity, since it was geographically uniform and otherwise
equally applied to all who used the facilities offered at exchanges.206
Knowlton v. Moore – 1900
Holding: a succession tax is a duty or excise.207
A year after Nicol, the Supreme Court considered in Knowlton the
validity of a succession tax on legacies and distributive shares of
personal property.208 Justice White, writing the Court’s opinion,
observed that death duties relate not to the property itself but to the
act of transferring that property by will or descent.209 Death duties
had always been considered different from taxes on property, and
succession taxes were always treated as duties—i.e. indirect.210
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 513, 515–16.
Id. at 514, 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78–79, 83 (1900). As the Court explained, a
probate duty is one charged upon the entire estate, a legacy duty is one “charged upon
each legacy or distributive share of [personal property], and a succession duty [is one]
charged against each interest in real property.” Id. at 51.
208. Id. at 43, 46.
209. Id. at 43, 47.
210. Id. at 78.
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Pointing to Scholey, and refuting the argument that Pollock overruled
it, White concluded that the succession tax was an indirect duty or
excise.211 He also refuted the argument that, since the succession tax
was not capable of being shifted, it must be direct.212 The
“shiftability theory” advocated by some economists had never been
adopted by the court as the basis of direct tax classification, which
relies on specific constitutional meanings.213
Patton v. Brady – 1902
Holding: a tobacco tax is an excise.214 An excise can be
defined as a tax (1) levied on articles intended for
consumption, and (2) imposed between the beginning of
manufacture and final consumption.215
In Patton, the Supreme Court addressed whether a tax on
manufactured tobacco held by dealers was an excise.216 Justice
Brewer, writing for the Court, found that it was. Referring to the
definition of excise by commentators and dictionaries, and
considering governmental practice in levying excises, he deduced a
two-part definition of such a tax. An excise is a tax (1) levied “upon
goods intended for consumption,” and (2) imposed at some point
“intermediate the beginning of manufacture or production and the act
of consumption.”217 A tobacco tax was an indirect excise under any
definition, for “it is not a tax upon property as such, but upon certain
kinds of property, having reference to their origin and their intended
use.”218 Further, the power to impose excise taxes is not exhausted
once exercised, so that goods and property are generally not immune
from double taxation.219

211. Id. at 81. The Court affirmed the Pollock holding as prohibiting a tax “imposed upon
property solely by reason of its ownership[.]” Id. As to the succession tax, the Court
understood it to apply to the privilege of transmitting property at death, and not to a
claimed right of transmission, which would have suggested a tax on property because
of ownership. Some commentators critique the post-Pollock cases for errantly reading
the “solely by reason of its ownership” language into Pollock. E.g., Riddle, supra
note 63, at 571.
212. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 81–82.
213. Id.
214. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 615, 623 (1902).
215. Id. at 617.
216. Id. at 615.
217. Id. at 617.
218. Id. at 619.
219. Id. at 621–22.
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Thomas v. United States – 1904
Holding: a tax on the sale of stock certificates is indirect.220
Duties, imposts, and excises elude precise definition and
likely cover all indirect taxes.221
Thomas is a typical case for the period where, in the light of
Pollock’s expansive definition of direct taxation, courts frequently
faced the argument that since the right of transfer is an inherent
attribute of property, a tax upon such a transfer was substantially a
levy on the property itself and so a direct tax requiring
apportionment.222 In Thomas, at issue was a stamp tax imposed on
agreements of sale of stock certificates.223 Chief Justice Fuller,
writing for the Court, noted that there are two broad classes of
levies—”taxes” and “duties, imposts, and excises”—which
“apparently embrace all forms of taxation contemplated by the
Constitution.”224 Although duties, imposts, and excises escape
precise definition, these terms “were used comprehensively to cover
customs and excise duties imposed on importation, consumption,
manufacture, and sale of certain commodities, privileges, particular
business transactions, vocations, occupations, and the like”—in other
words, indirect taxes.225 The stamp duty in question was contingent
upon a sale of stock, a business transaction “in the exercise of the
privilege afforded by the laws in respect to corporations of disposing
of property in the form of certificates[,]” where “the element of
absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking.”226 The tax, as with
stamp taxes generally, was therefore indirect.227
Spreckels Sugar Refining Company v. McClain – 1904
Holding: a gross annual receipts tax on companies is an
excise.228

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370–71 (1904).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 370–71.
Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 412–13 (1904).
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Spreckels Sugar Refining Company saw a challenge to a tax on the
gross annual receipts above $250,000 of petroleum and sugar refining
companies.229 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, observed that
“the tax is not imposed upon gross annual receipts as property, but
only in respect of the carrying on or doing the business of refining
sugar.”230 Moreover, Congress called the tax a “special excise,”
which served at least partially to elucidate its intent.231 The Court’s
past decisions were in accord with holding the tax an excise, and
there was no need to reexamine the grounds upon which those
judgments rested.232
Flint v. Stone Tracy Company – 1911
Holding: a tax on a corporation’s business, measured as a
percentage of its income, is an excise.233 “[D]uties, imposts,
and excises are generally treated as embracing the indirect
forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution.”234
Flint examined the validity of a “special excise tax” on the business
of corporations, levied at a rate of one percent upon the entire net
income over $5,000 from all sources.235 Justice Day, writing for the
Court, noted that, while the statutory classification of a tax is not
entirely dispositive, it “is entitled to much weight.”236 Justice Day
distinguished Pollock on the grounds that there, the tax “was imposed
upon property simply because of its ownership[,]” whereas in the
instant case, the tax was occasioned upon the “carrying on or doing
of business in the designated [corporate] capacity[.]”237
The
difference between “mere ownership of property” and the “actual
doing of business in a certain way” was substantive.238 Duties,
imposts, and excises were generally considered to embrace all forms
of indirect taxes.239
Thomas Cooley’s constitutional treatise
distinguished duties and imposts as levies on import and export,
whereas excises could be understood as (1) manufacture, sale, and
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 410–11 (quoting Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464).
Id. at 405, 411.
Id. at 411 (quoting Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464).
Id. at 411–12.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 145–46, 151–52 (1911).
Id. at 151.
Id. at 142, 145–46.
Id. at 142, 145.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
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consumption taxes, (2) occupational license taxes, and (3) taxes upon
corporate privileges.240 The corporate tax could be described best as
“an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a
corporate capacity,” where the “element of absolute and unavoidable
demand is lacking.”241 It could be measured validly by the income of
a corporation, even if part of it originated from property that itself
would be considered non-taxable or property not actively used in the
business.242
B. Cases Interpreting Direct Taxes in Consideration of the Sixteenth
Amendment
The Sixteenth Amendment indelibly altered the nature of inquiries
into the definition of direct taxes.243 The Supreme Court cases
following the Amendment’s ratification in 1913 merit treatment in a
separate section, for they inevitably rely on the changes it wrought to
the constitutional structure of taxation. It is difficult to separate the
legal analyses of the meaning of direct taxation from those of the
Sixteenth Amendment, since both are necessarily intertwined.244
Whereas before 1913 the Constitution recognized direct and indirect
taxes as the two primary analytical categories, the Amendment
introduced a third—income taxes—which, to the extent they were
direct, were now exempt from apportionment. This innovation meant
240. Id. at 151.
241. Id. at 151–52.
242. Id. at 165. For another case addressing the same corporate tax, see Stratton’s Indep.,
Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 420 (1913), where the Court held that a mining
corporation was engaged in a business, notwithstanding that it was arguably
converting capital assets from one form to another, similarly to a manufacturing
company. The corporate tax was held to be not an income tax but a levy on the
corporation’s business activity, the same distinction made two years earlier in Flint v.
Stone Tracey Co. Id. at 415. The line of reasoning in these cases has been criticized
as fundamentally unworkable. See, e.g., Riddle, supra note 63, at 572–73 (arguing
that the distinction between income taxes and excise taxes on business measured by
income is tenuous). The Supreme Court was confronted with taxes that had always
been considered indirect, but applying Pollock to them would lead to a contrary result.
The Court’s desire to reconcile two irreconcilable views led to the incoherent result
that an income tax is not an income tax if called an excise.
243. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard
to any census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
244. See Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax
Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 357 (2004) (“The process of interpreting the
Amendment is inevitably also the process of interpreting the Clauses. You can’t hope
to understand the Amendment without understanding what it was a reaction to.”).
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that no analysis of the direct-indirect tax distinction could be
complete without also examining what is “income.”
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company – 1916
Holding: income taxes are indirect and subject to
uniformity.245 The Sixteenth Amendment overturned
Pollock, which had held that that a direct tax on income was
in effect a direct tax on the property generating that income,
looking past the income to its source.246 The Amendment
prohibited such a source inquiry, thereby exempting from
apportionment income taxes, which on their own had always
been indirect.247 The progressive nature of an income tax
does not violate the Due Process Clause, although a
confiscatory tax might do so.248
Brushaber was the first Supreme Court case to analyze direct taxes
after the Sixteenth Amendment’s ratification, challenging various
income tax provisions of a law passed shortly after the Amendment’s
ratification. Now-Chief Justice White, who had dissented from the
Pollock decision, delivered the Court’s opinion. Examining the
history of income taxation in the United States, he determined that
the income taxes levied, although occasionally including income
from real and personal property, were not treated as “taxes directly on
property because of its ownership.”249 Chief Justice White then
interpreted Pollock in a novel way, finding that it had never held that
income taxes were direct taxes on property.250 Instead, the case
“recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an
excise . . . unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would
amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to
apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent.”251 In other
words, income taxes of any sort are, and have always been, excises
(and thus indirect), but because of their similarity to direct taxes
when levied on income from property, the Pollock Court had held
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1916).
Id. at 9–11.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16–17. In Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., the Court affirmed this holding, that an
income tax ought to be tested by what it is rather than by its origin, finding that a tax
on a mining company’s income was an excise levied on the results of its business.
240 U.S. 103, 114 (1916).
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them to be subject to apportionment to protect the constitutional
structure of taxation.252
Under this new interpretation, the Sixteenth Amendment did not
convey any new power of taxation, since Congress had always had
the power to tax incomes; rather, it served “to relieve all income
taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the
source whence the income was derived.”253 The Amendment was
intended to overturn the principle upon which Pollock was decided,
of holding an income tax direct based on “the burden which resulted
on the property from which the income was derived,” rather than “a
consideration of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it
directly operated.”254 It thus prevented an analysis of the sources
from which income was derived “in order to cause a direct tax on the
income to be a direct tax on the source itself, and thereby to take an
income tax out of the class of excises, duties and imposts, and place it
in the class of direct taxes.”255 This idiosyncratic interpretation likely
arose from the concern that if income taxes were direct, then not only
would they be exempt from the uniformity requirement, but they
would also be exempt from apportionment under the express terms of
the Sixteenth Amendment.256 Classifying income taxes as indirect
(though arguably contradicting Pollock) did the least violence to the
constitutional structure of taxation by ensuring that all existing taxes
were subject to either apportionment or uniformity.257
Chief Justice White concluded the decision with several further
points. First, the Uniformity Clause requires only geographical
uniformity.258 Second, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is
not a limitation on the taxation powers per se,259 except to the
theoretical extent that a tax in name might violate due process if it
amounts to “confiscation of property” (i.e., a taking) or leads to such
gross and obvious inequality as to amount to a taking.260 Third, the
252.
253.
254.
255.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 16–17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Although the Brushaber analysis can readily be criticized for
misinterpreting the Pollock decision, it did finally resolve the intractable conflict
between income taxes eo nomine and excise taxes measured as a percentage of
income. See supra note 242.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 24.
See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (noting that the Fifth
Amendment does not hinder Congress’s constitutional taxing power).
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24–25.
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progressive features of the tax on their own do not amount to an
“arbitrary abuse of power” violating due process.261
Eisner v. Macomber – 1920
Holding: taxation of income under the Sixteenth
Amendment requires realization of some gain.262 A tax on
stock dividends paid in the stock of the company issuing
them is not a tax on income but on property and is subject to
apportionment.263
The seminal case of Macomber considered whether, under the
Sixteenth Amendment, Congress had the power to tax as income a
stock dividend made to a shareholder against profits accumulated by
a corporation after the Amendment’s ratification.264 Justice Pitney,
writing for the Court, relied primarily on several then-recent cases
dealing with the statutory interpretation of income. He first cited
Towne v. Eisner265 for the proposition that a stock dividend neither
reduces the corporation’s property nor increases that of the
shareholder, reasoning that the statute in question could not be
construed more narrowly than the Sixteenth Amendment.266 Citing
two additional cases from the same term,267 Justice Pitney observed
261. Id. at 25. It has been remarked that the Court’s decision to not apply substantive due
process doctrine to taxation statutes, even while it was being applied to numerous
regulatory acts, was significant. See Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the
Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 12 (1987) (“[T]he courts
sensed that the federal income tax—even in an earlier day—was so full of debatable
distinctions that any attempt to police the Code in the name of substantive due process
would lead them from one provision to another in a never-ending process of judicial
review.”).
262. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207–08 (1920).
263. Id. at 212–13.
264. Although this case was limited to its facts—a stock dividend paid in common stock to
common stockholders—first the Treasury Department and then Congress in the
Revenue Act of 1921 exempted all stock dividends from tax. See Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 241–42 (1937) (dealing with statutory interpretation issues
arising from the 1921 Act); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446–47 (1936)
(holding that a distribution of a stock dividend in common stock to preferred
stockholders was taxable at distribution). The Court has been urged repeatedly to
overrule Macomber but so far has declined to do so. See, e.g., Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371, 403–04 (1943) (holding that Congress did not intend to tax the dividend
in question and therefore not reaching a Macomber analysis).
265. 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
266. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 203.
267. Id. at 202 (citing Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918) and Peabody v. Eisner, 247
U.S. 347 (1918), both also dealing with questions of statutory interpretation).
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that, on the other hand, extraordinary cash dividends and dividends
paid in stock of another company were taxable as income.268 Citing
yet another case of statutory interpretation,269 he found useful the
definition of income as “gain derived from capital, . . . labor, or . . .
both combined.”270 Pointing out that the text of the Sixteenth
Amendment provides for taxes on “incomes, from whatever source
derived,” and that “income” should be understood in its plain English
definition, he concluded that income can be defined as “a gain, a
profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the
property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed,
and coming in, being ‘derived’—that is, received or drawn by the
recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal.”271
A true stock dividend indicates that a company’s accumulated profits
had been capitalized; thus, although a shareholder is indeed richer
due to an increase in capital, there is no realization or receipt of any
income in the transaction.272 Congress has the power to tax
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 207. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. This line of reasoning—that income is gain from capital
or labor—has been used in many subsequent cases. See, e.g., Bowers v. KerbaughEmpire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926) (holding that settling a pre-WWI markdenominated debt to the German Deutsche Bank in devalued post-war marks was not
income just because settling in dollars would have resulted in forgiveness of a large
part of the loan); Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925) (concluding a
railroad subsidy payment by a foreign government was held to be a reimbursement for
capital expenditures, not profit or gain, and thus not income under the Sixteenth
Amendment).
272. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 211–12. However, later cases restricted the situations in
which capitalization is deemed to have occurred. In United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S.
156, 169–70 (1921), the Court held that a stock dividend in the form of a successor
corporation’s stock is income, unless the old and new companies are substantially
identical (formation of a new company in another state and a stock split were too
much). The companion case to Phellis, Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176,
183–84 (1921), where two oil companies spun off their pipeline business and
distributed stock in the new corporations to their shareholders, concluded that the
stock so distributed was income. A later case, Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 138
(1923), used the same reasoning to come to a similar conclusion, holding that the
stock of new corporations distributed upon the liquidation of an old corporation was a
taxable gain. See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541–42 (1925), for another
case of a reorganization where the new stock was held to be substantially different
from the old. However, see Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924), for a case
where a reorganization was deemed technical enough to avoid taxation on stock
distributed. Offering stock subscription rights to existing shareholders was also
similar enough to a stock dividend to not be taxable until those rights were sold.
Miles v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. of Balt., 259 U.S. 247, 252 (1922).
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shareholders on their property interests in corporate stock, even if
valued in reference to the company’s accumulated and undivided
profits, but this would be taxation of property because of ownership
and subject to apportionment.273
New York Trust Company v. Eisner – 1921
Holding: an estate tax is indirect.274
This case saw a challenge to a federal estate tax on the grounds that
it was a direct tax on a decedent’s property.275 Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, relied on Knowlton to dispose of the objection.
Although Knowlton dealt with an inheritance tax, and the present
case—with an estate tax,276 Holmes thought the distinction
immaterial. Death duties, broadly understood, “treated the ‘power to
transmit or the transmission or receipt of property by death’ as all
standing on the same footing.”277
Per Knowlton, historical
understanding and practice treated as indirect both the avoidable
inheritance tax and the inevitable estate tax.278 The inevitability of
the estate tax is insufficient to render it direct in the face of contrary
historical precedent, where on “this point a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.”279

273.
274.
275.
276.

Macomber, 252 U.S. at 217.
N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1921).
Id. at 349 (“It is argued . . . here the [estate] tax is inevitable and therefore direct.”).
Id. at 346. There is an oft-neglected distinction between an estate tax and an
inheritance tax (also called a succession or legacy tax). Estate taxes are levied on, and
with reference to, a decedent’s entire net estate. Estate Tax, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Inheritance taxes are levied on the property received by
a beneficiary from a decedent’s estate. Inheritance Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). In short hand, estate taxes work before distribution to beneficiaries,
and inheritance taxes after.
277. See N.Y. Tr. Co., 256 U.S. at 348–49 (quoting Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 57
(1900)).
278. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47. An estate tax is also indirect when applied to property held
by a husband and wife in a tenancy by the entirety, as the surviving spouse gains
substantial rights to that property, such as the sole right to dispose of it. Tyler v.
United States, 281 U.S. 497, 504 (1930); see also United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S.
363, 370 (1939) (applying the same reasoning and coming to the same result for
property held in a joint tenancy).
279. N.Y. Tr. Co., 256 U.S. at 349.
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Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. – 1922
Holding: a tax on net business profits is an excise.280 A
heavy burden alone does not make a tax a penalty, but a
putative tax may have such penalizing features as to become
a penalty.281 The act must be “reasonably adapted to the
collection of the tax” and not aimed to achieve an otherwise
unconstitutional purpose.282
This case dealt with the constitutional validity of a ten percent tax
on the net profits of any business that employed children younger
than fourteen years of age.283 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the
Court, found that the law in question was a regulation of child labor
and not a tax, citing: (1) the law’s stated intent; (2) that it provided a
detailed and specified course of business conduct; (3) that the penalty
was not proportioned to the extent or frequency of violations; and (4)
that its imposition required a knowing violation.284 If the law were a
tax, it would be “clearly an excise[,]” and the Court would not “infer
solely from its heavy burden that the act intends a prohibition instead
of a tax.”285 However, an ostensible tax might have such penalizing
features that “it loses its character as such and becomes a mere
penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.”286 A
motive other than taxation is insufficient to invalidate a tax, although
“the taxing act must be naturally and reasonably adapted to the
collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of some other
purpose plainly within state power.”287
Bromley v. McCaughn – 1929
Holding: a gift tax is an excise.288 Taxes levied based on
general ownership are direct, whereas taxes levied based on
280. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 35–36, 42–43
(1922).
281. Id. at 36–37.
282. Id. at 43; see also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1922) (striking down a perbushel tax on grain futures contracts settled on certain boards of trade on the grounds
that the tax’s purpose was to compel the boards to comply with regulations not related
to the tax’s collection).
283. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 20.
284. Id. at 36–37, 41.
285. Id. at 36.
286. Id. at 38.
287. Id. at 43.
288. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138 (1929).
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a particular use of property or exercise of power incidental
to ownership are excises.289 A graduated rate schedule is
constitutional.290
In Bromley, Justice Stone, writing for the Court, addressed, first,
whether a gift tax was direct and, second, whether its graduated rate
schedule violated the Uniformity Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.291 On the first issue, noting the opacity of
“direct taxes[,]” he articulated a succinct distinguishing rule: while
taxes levied upon persons “because of their general ownership of
property may be taken to be direct . . . a tax imposed upon a
particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over
property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be
apportioned.”292 With the gift tax, as with other levies like legacy
taxes, but one of the many rights of property was being taxed.293 It
was thus not a tax falling on an owner merely because of his passive
ownership regardless of use or disposition of property. Justice Stone
did not find convincing the objection that so many of the rights of
property could be taxed as to have a net effect of taxing ownership
itself.294 On the second issue, he observed that uniformity “is
geographic not intrinsic,” and that graduated taxes have long been
upheld as constitutional and are not on their own “so arbitrary and
unreasonable” as to violate the dictates of due process.295
Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co. – 1934
Holding: Congress may limit deductions from gross income
to arrive at the net it chooses to tax.296
In this case at issue was a revenue provision allowing life insurance
companies to deduct expenses for real estate owned and occupied
wholly or partially by the company, provided that rental value of at
least four percent of the real property’s book value, in addition to

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
See id. at 137–38 (opining that the power to give is a power incidental to ownership,
and a tax levied upon such a limited use is distinguishable from a direct tax on the
property itself).
295. Id. at 138–39.
296. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).

2015

Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes

93

rental income from other tenants, was included in annual income.297
Justice Butler, writing for the Court, addressed whether this
amounted to a tax on the rental value of space occupied by such a
company.298 He conceded that a tax “on the part of a building
occupied by the owner” would be a direct tax, as “[t]he rental value
[of such property] does not constitute income within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment.”299 However, the statutory formula
operated in lieu of an apportionment of expenses, resulting in “a
diminution or apportionment of expenses to be deducted from gross
income”—effectively, a condition or limit on deductions from gross
income—a power that Congress may freely exercise “to arrive at the
net that it chooses to tax.”300 Accordingly, the tax was not on real
property owned and occupied by the owner and thus was indirect.301
United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. – 1936
Holding: income is treated as income when its amount
becomes certain and definite.302
Here, a company on the accrual accounting method had brought a
patent infringement suit against another company for actions
occurring both before and after the effective date of the Sixteenth
Amendment, eventually confining its claim to profits and settling the
suit in 1925.303 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, considered
whether the company owed tax only on the profits attributable to the
period after the Amendment was ratified.304 He observed that the
amount of liability was contested until the settlement in 1925, and
that the claim was too contingent and indefinite to be considered
accrued income at the time when the Sixteenth Amendment and the
first revenue law adopted under it became effective in 1913.305 An
“expectancy of income, or income, . . . in the process of becoming” is
insufficient to be income proper; rather, it must be certain and
definite to be considered income.306 Income under the Sixteenth
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 381.
See id.
United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936).
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 90, 94.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 99.
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Amendment “is the fruit that is born of capital, not the potency of
fruition.”307 Further, the acceptance of a settlement lower than the
value of the claim at a certain point in time involves a loss of neither
income nor capital.308
Sonzinsky v. United States – 1937
Holding: a court will not speculate on congressional motives
behind a tax or its restrictive effects, so long as it produces
some revenue, is “not attended by offensive regulation, and .
. . operates as a tax.”309
In Sonzinsky, the petitioner challenged an annual license tax on
firearms dealers on the grounds that it was a penalty imposed to
suppress traffic in certain firearms.310 Justice Stone, writing for the
Court, observed that the statute did not contain express regulatory
provisions, nor was the subject of the tax treated as criminal.311 All
taxes have regulatory components to establish “economic
impediment[s]” on the things taxed, and a regulatory effect is
insufficient to invalidate a tax.312 Indeed, “it has long been
established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be
an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax
is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.”313 So
long as a tax operates as a tax, produces some revenue, and is not
accompanied by “an offensive regulation,” the courts will not
speculate on the congressional motives in imposing the tax—or its
regulatory effects.314
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis – 1937
Holding: a tax on certain employers, measured by wages
paid, is a valid excise.315 Direct taxes and duties, imposts,
and excises (i.e. indirect taxes) include every form of
possible taxation.316 The actual classification of an indirect
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id.
Id. at 100.
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 511, 513.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578–83 (1937).
Id. at 581.

2015

Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes

95

tax as an excise, impost, or duty is unimportant, as the result
is the same.317
In this case, a company challenged a tax measured as a percentage
of total wages payable by employers with eight or more employees.318
Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, determined that the statute is
“an excise upon the relation of employment.”319 He disagreed with
the claim that because “employment is a right, not a privilege,” it is
exempt from excises, finding that history and conceptual analyses
pointed to excises applying to both.320 Congress has broad discretion
to choose the subject matter of taxation, circumscribed somewhat by
different restrictions on the respective classes of taxes.321 “Together,
these classes include every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty.
Whether the tax is to be classified as an ‘excise’ is in truth not of
critical importance. If not that, it is an ‘impost,’ or a ‘duty.’ A
capitation or other ‘direct’ tax it certainly is not.”322 Further, the tax
did not violate the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding the various
exemptions from the excise.323 Even states, which are subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (to which the
federal government is not, for the Fifth Amendment lacks such a
clause), “are not confined to a formula of rigid uniformity in framing
measures of taxation.”324
Helvering v. Bruun – 1940
Holding: severance of an improvement begetting gain from
the original capital is unnecessary for realization to occur.325

317. Id. at 581–82.
318. Id. at 573–74. Similar issues were raised in the companion case of Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937), where the Supreme Court, on the same grounds as in
Steward Machine Co., upheld a Social Security excise upon employers and a special
income tax on employees to be deducted from their wages and paid by the
employers—the analogue to modern withholding under the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA). See generally I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012) (requiring that
employers withhold a set percentage of their employees’ wages, to be matched by
employers, as part of the Social Security Trust Fund).
319. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 578.
320. Id. at 578–79.
321. Id. at 581–82.
322. Id. (citations omitted).
323. Id. at 583.
324. Id. at 584.
325. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940).
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In Bruun, a tenant demolished a building on leased land and
constructed a new one with a higher fair market value.326 Upon the
lease’s termination, the government determined that the owner
realized a net gain on the transaction.327 Justice Roberts, writing for
the Court, disagreed with the owner’s contention that under the
Sixteenth Amendment added value can be realized only on the
owner’s disposition of the asset.328 Although “economic gain is not
always taxable as income, it is settled that the realization of gain need
not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset.”329 Severance of “the
improvement begetting the gain from the original capital” was
unnecessary for recognition of taxable gain.330 “Gain may occur as a
result of exchange of property, payment of the taxpayer’s
indebtedness, relief from a liability, or other profit realized from the
completion of a transaction.”331 Nevertheless, realization of gain in
some form is still a necessary condition for a taxable event to
occur.332
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 464–65.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. Justice Roberts cited a series of statutory interpretation cases dealing with the
realization of gain under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 469 n.9. See
United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566–67 (1938) (holding that a corporation
realized gain on a merger involving both an exchange of stock or securities);
Helvering v. Am. Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 430 (1934) (holding that a company
realized income from debt forgiveness, when it assumed bonds which it later
redeemed at less than face value); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3
(1931) (holding that a company realized income from debt forgiveness, when it
redeemed its own bonds at less than face value); Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279
U.S. 716, 731 (1929) (holding that an employer’s payment of income taxes assessable
against an employee was additional taxable income to that employee); Marr v. United
States, 268 U.S. 536, 540 (1925) (holding that an exchange of securities of a New
Jersey corporation for different securities of a Delaware corporation was income to
the stockholder); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 137–38 (1923) (holding that the
stock of new corporations distributed upon the liquidation of an old corporation was a
taxable gain). A case that followed Bruun by only ten days was Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940), in which the Court held that the gift of interest coupons
detached from bonds and in the same year paid at maturity was akin to an assignment
of income and taxable to the bondholder.
332. Accordingly, half a century later, in Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, the
Court held that a financial institution had realized a tax loss on exchanging its
interests in a loan portfolio for another lender’s interests in a different portfolio
because the properties were different materially, and the owners enjoyed “legal
entitlements . . . different in kind or extent.” 499 U.S. 554, 565 (1991). Justice
Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, elaborated on the realization
concept:
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Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins – 1940
Holding: taxation may be used as a sanction to enforce
regulatory provisions of laws.333
Here, at issue was an extraordinary 19.5% tax on sales of
bituminous coal by producers who refused to participate in a coal
regulatory scheme.334 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
observed that while the tax was “not designed merely for revenue
purposes” and was “a sanction to enforce the regulatory provisions of
the Act,” this alone was insufficient to invalidate it, as the taxation
power “may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another
power which is granted it.”335 Furthermore, Douglas found that the
application of the tax to some types of coal (i.e., that produced by
non-compliant companies) but not to others was not discriminatory
under the Fifth Amendment: “the Fifth Amendment, unlike the
It long has been established that gain or loss in the value of
property is taken into account for income tax purposes only if and
when the gain or loss is “realized,” that is, when it is tied to a
realization event, such as the sale, exchange, or other disposition
of the property. Mere variation in value—the routine ups and
downs of the marketplace—do not in themselves have income tax
consequences. This is fundamental in income tax laws.
Id. at 569–70.
Although the realization requirement has been circumscribed in some respects, see
Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 20 (“Thus, while Eisner v. Macomber nominally stands
as a constitutional barrier to taxing unrealized appreciation, the reality is that the
Court, through its own action and its acquiescence in congressional action, has
relegated the realization requirement to the lower realm of administrative
convenience.”), with some commentators suggesting that it has been abandoned, see
Testimony of David Rosenbloom at the Finance Hearing on Expatriate Taxation
Before the Senate Committee on Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and Internal
Revenue Service Oversight, 104th Cong. 51 (1995) (statement of H. David
Rosenbloom), the Court has steadfastly refused to overrule Macomber’s realization
holding, evidenced as recently as Chief Justice Roberts’s citing the case in his opinion
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598
(2012).
For good defenses of realization, see Erik M. Jensen, The Constitutionality of a Markto-Market Taxing System, 143 TAX NOTES 1299 (2014); Mark E. Berg, Bar the Exit
(Tax)! Section 877A, the Constitutional Prohibition Against Unapportioned Direct
Taxes and the Realization Requirement, 65 TAX LAW. 181, 192–205 (2012); Henry
Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber,
and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 58 (1993).
333. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940).
334. Id. at 389, 391–92.
335. Id. at 393.
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Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause,” and in any case, the tax
was a constitutionally permissible sanction for non-compliance with
the statutory regulatory scheme.336
Fernandez v. Wiener – 1945
Holding: an estate tax on the entire community property is
an excise.337 A tax on real estate or chattels is direct.338 On
the other hand, a tax on a “particular use or enjoyment of
property or the shifting from one to another of any power or
privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of
property” is indirect.339
Fernandez saw another challenge to the federal estate tax, this time
as applied to the community property estate of a husband and wife
upon one spouse’s death.340 Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
Court, disagreed with the claim that a spouse’s death in a community
property state results in a transfer of only the half share held by the
decedent and that a tax upon the remainder is a direct tax subject to
apportionment.341 He noted that the taxing power “extends to the
creation, exercise, acquisition, or relinquishment of any power or
legal privilege which is incident to the ownership of property, and
when any of these is occasioned by death, it may as readily be the
subject of the federal tax as the transfer of the property at death.”342
336. Id. at 400–01. The Fifth Amendment’s interpretation would change with later
Supreme Court jurisprudence to include equal protection components. This shift,
however, did not see any change in the Court’s position on discriminatory taxation.
That position was summarized by Justice Rehnquist in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington, where, in the context of a challenge under the First and
Fifth Amendments by a non-profit organization to the § 501(c)(3) restrictions on
lobbying, he observed that Congress has “especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.” 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). Although
“[b]oth tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy,” id. at 544, such
tax preferences are subject to heightened scrutiny only when “they interfere with the
exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect
classification, such as race.” Id. at 547. As for the First Amendment, discretionary
subsidies through the Tax Code are generally subject to standard rational basis review,
so long as the “governmental provision of subsidies is not ‘aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.’” Id. at 550 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513
(1959)).
337. Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 343–44.
341. Id. at 346–47.
342. Id. at 352.

2015

Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes

99

The Court had long held that “Congress may tax real estate or
chattels if the tax is apportioned, and without apportionment it may
tax an excise upon a particular use or enjoyment of property or the
shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to
the ownership or enjoyment of property.”343 As in previous cases
dealing with estate taxes imposed on property held in a tenancy by
the entirety and joint tenancy, the husband’s death changed the rights
and powers of the wife to the community property, which was
sufficient to justify imposing an excise upon the entire value of it.344
The tax did not violate constitutional due process guarantees, as it
was not arbitrary or capricious, nor did it violate uniformity, for it
applied to the entire United States geographically, notwithstanding
that some states had marital community property laws and others did
not.345
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius – 2012
Holding: Congress may tax inactivity, as taxing inactivity is
economically identical to giving a tax incentive for
activity.346 Direct taxes include capitations, taxes on real
and personal property, and income from property; the
Sixteenth Amendment overturned the result as to the
latter.347 A tax may be so punitive as to cease being a tax;
however, the precise point at which this can occur is
undecided.348
343. Id.
344. Id. at 354–55.
345. Id. at 358–60; see supra notes 207–13 (discussing the uniformity requirement as
applied to variations in state law).
346. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012).
347. Id. at 2598.
348. Id. at 2600. The lead up to and aftermath of this case led to a flurry of activity among
commentators, who with great relish overturned nearly every rock they could find in
attempts to validate or condemn the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The
Taxing Power, The Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of Constitutional
Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407, 409–12 (2011) (explaining that the
individual responsibility requirement portion of the Affordable Care Act is a tax rather
than a penalty); Mark A. Hall, A Healthcare Case for the Ages, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE
SCI. L. 1, 12 (2012) (explaining that the Affordable Care Act is a tax for constitutional
purposes); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83,
92–93 (2012) (explaining that even though it was labeled as a penalty in the Act, it
was “paid as part of most Americans’ most basic tax action” and even if it were not a
tax, “Congress should be able to require individuals to purchase health insurance or
pay a penalty . . . .”).
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This case addressed several substantive tax questions related to a
“shared responsibility payment” on individuals without health
insurance.349 The exaction, paid by taxpayers when they filed their
income tax returns, applied only to individuals whose income
exceeded the threshold for filing returns and was computed with
reference to a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.350 Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the Court, held that the payment was a tax,
notwithstanding that it was called a “penalty” in the statute.351 The
label was not dispositive on the constitutional question—a
substantive analysis was necessary. Chief Justice Roberts outlined
four considerations to analyze whether a levy is a tax: (1) whether it
produces “some revenue for the government”;352 (2) whether it avoids
“impos[ing] an exceedingly heavy burden”;353 (3) whether it lacks the
elements of a punitive statute, such as a scienter requirement; and (4)
whether it is enforced by the revenue service alone.354 Finding that
the exaction in question answered each consideration affirmatively,
he concluded that it reasonably may be deemed a tax.355 Moreover, it
was not a punishment for an unlawful act or omission, and there were
no “negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance,
beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.”356
Roberts, having found the payment to be a tax, then considered
whether it was a direct tax requiring apportionment. To that effect,
he observed that by the early 20th century, direct taxes were
understood to include capitations, taxes on property both real and
personal, and income from property.357 After 1913, however, “[t]hat
result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we
349. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–99 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)
(2012)).
350. Id. at 2594 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2)).
351. Id.
352. Id. (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 n.4 (1953)).
353. Id. at 2595 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922)) (explaining that
the ostensible “tax,” in that case was determined to be a penalty because it was ten
percent of a company’s net income, without regard to the magnitude of the infraction).
354. Id. For a variation on this idea, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power
to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99
(2012), which develops an “effects theory” of the distinction between taxes and
penalties that follows the Chief Justice’s reasoning in this case. Practically speaking,
the Court is unlikely to hold an exaction an unconstitutional penalty, for the bar has
been set so high, although the theoretical possibility remains. E.g., Stewart Jay, On
Slippery Constitutional Slopes and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1133,
1175–87 (2012).
355. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
356. Id. at 2597.
357. Id. at 2598.
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continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct
taxes.”358 The tax at issue was not one on the ownership of land or
personal property.359 It also was not a capitation, for capitations are
taxes paid by every person without regard to any particular
circumstance; here, the payment was triggered by two specific
circumstances—earning income above a certain threshold and not
obtaining health insurance.360 Further, “the Constitution does not
guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity,” as
the document recognizes, for example, capitations—taxes “that
everyone must pay simply for existing”—as a form of acceptable
tax.361 In any case, taxing an individual for not doing something has
358. Id. (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1920)). It is unclear what
Chief Justice Roberts meant here by stating that “[t]hat result was overturned by the
Sixteenth Amendment.” Did he refer to the result that a tax on income, regardless of
whether it may be considered direct, is no longer subject to apportionment? Or that
the Sixteenth Amendment took income out of the definition of a direct tax entirely?
Some Supreme Court precedent, and Eisner v. Macomber in particular (which upheld
Pollock generally, albeit without reference to this particular question), might suggest
the former. But see Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1916) (holding
that the Sixteenth Amendment, in overturning certain holdings in Pollock, prohibited
inquiries to the source of income, thereby exempting from apportionment income
taxes which are—on account of the lack of source inquiry—in fact indirect). Chief
Justice Roberts’s language here is ambiguous. If he thought the Sixteenth
Amendment to have reclassified income taxes as indirect, then why not say as much
or at least cite to Brushaber? That the Chief Justice did not is highly telling.
This question is more than theoretical. If the Sixteenth Amendment simply removed
the apportionment requirement for direct income taxes, then they are constrained
neither by apportionment nor uniformity. If the Amendment somehow converted
income taxes from direct to indirect, then they are subject to uniformity. Granted, no
income taxes to date have violated geographical uniformity, and the prospect of such a
tax being enacted seems remote, not to say that a non-geographically uniform income
tax would probably violate constitutional due process guarantees.
359. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
360. Chief Justice Roberts did not attempt to definitively classify the tax, which did not go
unnoticed among commentators. See Matthew A. Melone, The Pundits Doth Protest
Too Much: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and the Future of
the Taxing Power, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1240 (2012) (“It is not clear whether
the Court believed that the individual mandate is not a direct tax subject to
apportionment because it is an income tax or because it is an excise tax irrespective of
the method in which it is calculated.”).
361. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599. This analogy is troublesome, as
capitations—taxes on “simply . . . existing”—are direct, yet Chief Justice Roberts
contended that the payment was indirect. Professor Kleinbard anticipated and
sidestepped this problem by arguing that the penalty is a tax on the provision of health
care self-insurance and not a tax on inactivity at all. Edward D. Kleinbard,
Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NOTES 755, 756 (2010). The penalty has also been
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the same economic effect as giving that individual a tax incentive to
do that thing. Although taxes may theoretically be extended in such a
manner as to become excessively punitive, and “Congress’s ability to
use its taxing power to influence conduct is not without limits,” the
present case did not require the Court to determine the “precise
point” where the line would be drawn.362
C. Cases Interpreting the Uniformity Clause
While direct taxes are limited by the apportionment requirement,
indirect taxes are constrained by uniformity.363 The doctrine here is
simpler than that of direct taxes, and the cases examined will be few
in number. After Knowlton v. Moore, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on this topic has more or less repeated that case’s
holding: the Uniformity Clause requires only geographical
uniformity.
United States v. Singer – 1872
Holding: the Uniformity Clause requires uniformity in a
tax’s operation—that the tax must apply equally wherever
the taxable object may be.364
In Singer, at issue was a tax on distillers assessed at a minimum of
eighty percent of the distillery’s producing capacity, regardless of its
actual operating capacity.365 Justice Field, writing for the Court,
concluded that the tax was an excise and thus subject to uniformity
throughout the United States.366 The tax was “uniform in its
operation; that is, it is assessed equally upon all manufacturers of
spirits wherever they are. The law does not establish one rule for one
distiller and a different rule for another, but the same rule for all
alike.”367

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

called a tax on a particular use of wealth (for purposes other than purchasing health
insurance) or a tax on a particular form of insurance (shifting the cost from one’s self
to society). Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health
Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27, 31–32 (2010).
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599–600.
“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111, 121 (1872).
Id. at 118.
Id. at 121.
Id.

2015

Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes

103

Edye v. Robertson – 1884
Holding: a tax is uniform when it operates with equal force
and effect in every place where its subject is found; the
Uniformity Clause does not contemplate perfect equality.368
In the Head Money Cases, a ship owner challenged a duty on nonU.S. citizen passengers arriving by vessel at any American port; the
revenue from which went to a fund to defray the expense of
regulating immigration.369 Justice Miller, writing for the Court,
observed that the uniformity required by the Constitution was only
geographical.370 “[A] tax is uniform when it operates with the same
force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”371
The challenged tax was an excise duty operating “precisely alike in
every port of the United States where [foreign] passengers can be
landed.”372 It was not fatal that the tax only applied to marine ports
and not inland borders. “Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of
taxation, in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it, is a
baseless dream.”373
Chief Justice Miller concluded that the
imposition in question, though “as far as it can be called a tax, [it] is
an excise duty,”374 was in fact imposed not under the taxation power
but as a regulation of commerce and immigration.375 Nonetheless, he
likely would have upheld it under the taxing power if none other were
available.376
Knowlton v. Moore – 1900
Holding: the Uniformity Clause requires only geographical
uniformity.377
Knowlton, discussed above in the context of classifying direct
taxes, is also relevant in its analysis of the Uniformity Clause.378 The

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 595 (citing Taylor v. Secor (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U.S. 575, 612 (1876)
(examining the courts’ equity jurisdiction to restrain the collection of state taxes)).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
See id.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 105–06 (1900).
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issue in this case was whether duties, imposts, and excises need be
imposed on an intrinsically equal and uniform basis in their operation
on individuals (i.e., whether a progressive tax was prohibited), or
whether they were constrained solely by geographical uniformity.379
Justice White, writing for the Court, concluded that interpreting the
Uniformity Clause to require equal treatment of all individuals would
deprive the words “throughout the United States” of meaning.380 The
provision’s intent was to forbid geographical discrimination by the
national government.381 Indirect taxes were never understood to be
subject to inherent equality and uniformity, and congressional
practice in the United States had always adhered to geographical
uniformity but not to other forms of equal application.382 White
observed that the reasoning of the Head Money Cases on the
constitutional prohibition of port preferences also applied to the
Uniformity Clause, as both provisions were treated in their operation
as identical by the Constitutional Convention.383 White also rejected
the argument that a progressive tax was fundamentally unjust and
should be held void.384 The question of progressivity was a
legislative, not judicial, one, and no constitutional limitation
supported striking down the law on that basis.385 He declined to
378. The holdings in this case as to the Uniformity Clause have been reaffirmed exactly by
numerous subsequent cases. See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24
(1916); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911).
379. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84–85.
380. Id. at 87.
381. Id. at 89. Differences in state laws affecting federal tax liability do not cause a federal
tax to violate the uniformity requirement. See Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 602
(1931) (“The extent and incidence of federal taxes not infrequently are affected by
differences in state laws; but such variations do not infringe the constitutional
prohibitions against delegation of the taxing power or the requirement of geographical
uniformity.”); see also Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 102 (1942) (“Nor does the
fact that the ultimate incidence of the federal estate tax is governed by state law
violate the requirement of geographical uniformity.”); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101,
117–18 (1930) (“[D]ifferences of state law, which may bring a person within or
without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read . . . to spell
out a lack of uniformity.”).
382. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 92. A broader reading of the Uniformity Clause would have
made impossible the current system of taxation in the United States. See Bittker,
supra note 261, at 10 (“A broad reading of the uniformity clause . . . would not only
have rendered exemptions and differential tax rates unconstitutional, but it might well
have invalidated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income and a host
of other provisions that make up the warp and woof of the Internal Revenue Code.”).
383. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 106.
384. Id. at 109.
385. Id. at 109–10.
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consider whether the judicial branch had the power to overturn “an
arbitrary and confiscatory exaction . . . imposed bearing the guise of a
progressive or any other form of tax,” as the present case did not fall
into that category.386
United States v. Ptasynski – 1983
Holding: it does not violate uniformity to define the subject
of a tax in geographical terms where a unique class merits
special treatment.387
For over eighty years after Knowlton, the Court did not address any
novel Uniformity Clause challenges until Ptasynski, where at issue
was an excise had been levied on crude oil extracted in the United
States.388 Exempted from the tax were certain classes of oil defined
in geographical terms, including “exempt Alaskan oil.”389 Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, observed that “cases have confirmed
that the Framers did not intend to restrict Congress’ ability to define
the class of objects to be taxed.390 They intended only that the tax
apply wherever the classification is found.”391 The Uniformity
Clause is satisfied where the subject of a tax is defined in nongeographic terms, but it is not necessarily fatal to a tax’s validity for
the subject to be defined in geographical terms.392 In the latter
instance, a court ought to “examine the classification closely to see if
there is actual geographic discrimination.”393 With “exempt Alaskan
oil,” Powell concluded that it was a unique class meriting favorable
treatment due to the “disproportionate costs and difficulties—the
fragile ecology, the harsh environment, and the remote location—
associated with extracting oil from this region,” and that there was no
“indication that Congress sought to benefit Alaska for reasons that
would offend the purpose of the Clause.”394 Accordingly, the Court

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id.
See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983).
See id. at 75, 81.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85. This broad reading of the Uniformity Clause has caused some to question
whether the restriction has been read out of the Constitution entirely. See Nelson
Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1200–05 (1984).
394. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85–86.
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would not disturb congressional judgment on such “an enormously
complex problem[.]”395
D. Cases Interpreting the Export Clause
Although the Export Clause396 seems to speak for itself,397 the
Supreme Court has nonetheless addressed it on several occasions. In
the cases that follow, certain subtleties in the Clause become
apparent, with the unusual trend being to interpret its restrictions
expansively.
Pace v. Burgess – 1875
Holding: a fixed administrative fee imposed on exportbound goods without regard to quantity or value is not a tax
and does not violate the Export Clause.398
At issue in Pace was a law requiring that stamps be affixed to
packages of manufactured tobacco intended for exportation, per a law
imposing an excise tax on all such tobacco except that intended for
export; the stamp’s cost was fixed and did not vary depending on the
container’s size or weight.399 Justice Bradley, writing for the Court,
observed that “[t]he stamp was intended [only] to separate and
identify the tobacco which the manufacturer desired to export, and
thereby, instead of taxing it, to relieve it from the taxation to which
other tobacco was subjected.”400 The stamp was compensation for
395. Id. at 86.
396. “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 5.
397. Though perhaps not—the Clause has on occasion been pressed into service to argue
that it should limit non-tax export controls. See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of
Export Controls, 76 YALE L.J. 200, 201 (1966) (contending that export quotas on
certain key goods—iron, steel, aluminum, nickel, and sugar—the justification for
which was domestic scarcity, violated the Export Clause).
398. Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 373 (1875).
399. Id. A similar case to Pace arose again a decade later in Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S.
504 (1886). The Court there observed that although it would be unconstitutional to
impose a duty “on goods by reason or because of their exportation or intended
exportation, or whilst they are being exported. . . . a general tax, laid on all property
alike, and not levied on goods in course of exportation, nor because of their intended
exportation, is not within the constitutional prohibition.” Id. at 507. For support, the
Court cited to Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886), where it had upheld,
notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition on state taxes on imports and exports, a
general state property tax that included some property ultimately exported. Turpin,
117 U.S. at 506.
400. Pace, 92 U.S. at 375.

2015

Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes

107

administrative expenses, akin to a fee for clearing a vessel or
certifying a cargo manifest, evidenced by the stamp’s cost being
fixed at a single price bearing “no proportion whatever to the quantity
or value of the package on which it was affixed.”401 Since the charge
imposed was not excessive, and the stamp was not used for the
purpose of levying a duty or tax (rather, its intent was to secure
exemption from a tax), it did not run afoul of the constitutional
prohibition on export taxes.402
Fairbank v. United States – 1901
Holding: no tax may be levied which directly burdens
exportation.403
In Fairbank, at issue was a fixed stamp duty on bills of lading (i.e.,
shipping manifests) for export-bound goods, with internal bills
charged one cent and export bills charged ten.404 Justice Brewer,
writing for the Court, noted that the Constitution requires “that
exports should be free from any governmental burden. The language
is ‘no tax or duty.’”405 Congress, in imposing the duty on bills of
lading, “as effectually place[d] a burden upon exports as though it
placed a tax directly upon the articles exported. It can, for the
purposes of revenue, receive just as much as though it placed a duty
directly upon the articles, and it can just as fully restrict . . . free
exportation.”406 The restriction’s purpose was not solely to prevent
discrimination among states that would occur if export taxes were
imposed on certain articles produced in only several states.407 Rather,
the restriction serves to free all exports from federal burden. This
“requires not simply an omission of a tax upon the articles exported,
but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the
exportation.”408
Justice Brewer found support in the Court’s prior cases. Nicol v.
Ames409 held that a stamp tax imposed upon every instrument

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id.
Id. at 376.
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 295, 312 (1901).
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
173 U.S. 509 (1899).
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evidencing a sale was effectively a tax upon the property sold.410
Likewise, Brown v. Maryland411 held that a tax in the form of a
license required of importers was in fact a tax on imports, “and that
the mode of imposing it by giving it the form of a tax on the
occupation of importer merely varied the form without changing the
substance.”412 Several additional cases supported the proposition that
Congress cannot evade a restriction on taxation by imposing a tax on
people or items or actions incident to the subject on which a tax is
restricted.413 Brewer distinguished Pace, as there the stamp covered
the administrative costs of exempting tobacco, while in Fairbank “the
stamp [was] distinctly for the purpose of revenue and not by way of
compensation for services rendered.”414 Therefore, “a stamp tax on a
foreign bill of lading is in substance and effect equivalent to a tax on
the articles included in that bill of lading, and therefore a tax or duty
on exports, and in conflict with the constitutional prohibition.”415
Cornell v. Coyne – 1904
Holding: export-bound articles may be taxed by a generally
applicable law applying to all property similarly situated.416
Cornell saw a challenge to a general tax on filled cheese that did
not exempt product manufactured for export.417 Justice Brewer,
writing for the Court, observed that “[s]ubjecting filled cheese
manufactured for the purpose of export to the same tax as all other
filled cheese is casting no tax or duty on articles exported, but is only
a tax or duty on the manufacturing of articles in order to prepare them
for export.”418 The Export Clause requires only “that no burden by
way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and
does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior
ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id. at 293 (citing Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899)).
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
Id. at 295 (discussing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)).
Id. at 296–98.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 312. This reasoning was affirmed in United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1
(1915), where the Court struck down a stamp tax on charter parties carrying cargo
exclusively from American to foreign ports, finding that a tax on the charter parties
was substantially a tax on exportation.
416. Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 426 (1904).
417. Id. at 418–19.
418. Id. at 427.
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situated.”419 Thus, the Clause applies to export but not to articles
before their exportation—so a generally applicable tax could be
constitutionally applied to export-bound filled cheese.420
Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Company v. United States –
1915
Holding: a tax on a necessary incident to exportation
unconstitutionally burdens exports.421
At issue here were stamp taxes on marine insurance policies
insuring certain exports against marine risks in transit to foreign
ports.422 Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, concluded that “the
tax upon such policies so directly and closely related to the ‘process
of exporting’ that the tax is in substance a tax upon the
exportation.”423 On reference to standard shipping practice and the
government’s policy of insuring exports against war risks, he
observed that “the business of exporting requires not only the
contract of carriage, but appropriate provision for indemnity against
marine risks during the voyage. The policy of insurance is
universally recognized as one of the ordinary ‘shipping
documents.’”424 Since a tax on insurance policies burdens exports as
much as taxes on bills of lading and the goods themselves, the tax
was one on exports and unconstitutional.425
A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards – 1923
Holding: although a tax that attaches to goods in the
manufacturing stage does not violate the Export Clause, a
tax that attaches on the passing of title to export-bound
goods does.426

419. Id. Likewise, a generally applicable income tax can be levied on income from
exportation, since the net income that is taxed is at least “as far removed from
exportation as are articles intended for export before the exportation begins.” William
E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 175 (1918).
420. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427–28.
421. Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 27 (1915).
422. Id. at 22.
423. Id. at 25.
424. Id. at 26.
425. Id. at 27.
426. A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 66–70 (1923).
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At issue in A.G. Spalding & Bros. was whether a tax on certain
items sold by a manufacturer or importer could properly apply to
those items when commissioned by an agent for export.427 Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, noted that the transaction was intended
from the beginning to be one for exporting the goods.428 The fact that
the law was a general one “touching all sales of the class, and not
aimed specially at exports” would not be enough to sustain the tax as
applied to exports.429
Likewise, articles in the course of
transportation are also exempt from tax.430 The key question was in
fixing the point at which the export began.431 Per Cornell, goods still
in the process of manufacture, even if intended for export and made
with reference to a foreign order, are subject to taxation, whereas
those loaded on a foreign-bound vessel with bills of lading issued are
exempt.432 In the present case, the act of sale upon which the tax
would attach—the passing of the title—had already “committed the
goods to the carrier that was to take them across the sea, for the
purpose of export and with the direction to the foreign port upon the
goods.”433 At that point, the goods could not be taxed, since
exportation had begun.434 The theoretical possibility that the agent
could change its mind and retain the goods was too improbable to
justify a different approach.435
United States v. International Business Machines Corp. – 1996
Holding: the Export Clause strictly prohibits taxes,
discriminatory or not, falling on exports during the course of
exportation, including on services and activities closely
related to the export process.436 Pre-export goods and
services, however, are excluded.437
For over seventy years the Supreme Court remained silent on the
Export Clause, until it took it up in this case, where a company
challenged the imposition of a tax on insurance premiums it had paid
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 68.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. (citing William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 173 (1918)).
Id. at 69.
Id. (citing Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904)).
Id.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 70.
United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 843 (1996).
Id.
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to foreign insurers to cover shipments of goods to its foreign
subsidiaries.438 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, pointed out
that the Court “broadly exempted from federal taxation not only
export goods, but also services and activities closely related to the
export process[,]” while “limit[ing] the term ‘Articles exported’ to
permit federal taxation of pre-export goods and services.”439 In its
cases from the early 20th century, the Court made clear that “the
Export Clause strictly prohibits any tax or duty, discriminatory or not,
that falls on exports during the course of exportation.”440 However,
the Export Clause does not extend to pre-export goods and services,
nor does it cover “various services and activities only tangentially
related to the export process.”441 That said, the Clause’s text suggests
a broad intent to strictly limit the imposition of export taxes. Since
the question had not been raised of whether an assessment on a
particular activity or service is so closely connected to the exported
goods as to be a tax on the goods themselves, the Court declined to
reexamine the holding of Thames & Mersey.442 Thus, “the Export
Clause does not permit assessment of nondiscriminatory federal taxes
on goods in export transit[,]” and per Thames & Mersey, this
extended to insurance on export shipments.443
United States v. United States Shoe Corp. – 1998
Holding: a user fee affecting instrumentalities of export is
permissible if it is (1) proportionate to the quantity or value
of the goods exported, and (2) not excessive.444
In United States Shoe Corp., the Court addressed whether a tax
charged at 0.125% of the value of commercial cargo shipped through
American ports was an impermissible export tax.445 Justice Ginsburg,
438. Id.
439. Id. at 846.
440. Id. at 848. One of those cases, Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901), had
found that a duty on merchandise imported into Puerto Rico from New York was not
an export tax. Rather sensibly, the Court there held that the word “export” connotes
“something carried out of the United States,” that is “to goods exported to a foreign
country[,]” and since Puerto Rico is not a foreign country, goods carried from New
York to Puerto Rico are not being exported and thus are not subject to the Export
Clause. Id. at 154–55.
441. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. at 849–50.
442. Id. at 854–56.
443. Id. at 863.
444. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 369 (1998).
445. Id. at 363.
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writing for the Court, held that the tax, “imposed on an ad valorem
basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits
furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a
permissible user fee.”446 The Export Clause allows no room for any
federal tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on
goods in export transit.”447 An exaction is permissible if it is “a bona
fide user fee,” i.e. not proportionate to the quantity or value of the
goods exported and not excessive.448 The challenged tax failed the
user fee criteria since the tax was “determined entirely on an ad
valorem basis,” and “the value of the export cargo [did] not correlate
reliably with the federal harbor services used or usable by the
exporter.”449 A proper user fee would consider that “the extent and
manner of port use depend on factors such as the size and tonnage of
a vessel, the length of time it spends in port, and the services it
requires, for instance, harbor dredging.”450 In this case the tax did not
“fairly match the exporters’ use of port services and facilities[,]” and
so it was an unconstitutional export tax.451
E. In Summary
The threshold question in analyzing any exaction is whether it is a
tax for constitutional purposes or a penalty. To determine whether a
levy is a tax and subject to the restrictions of the tax clauses, the
Court will examine whether it (1) produces some revenue, (2) avoids
imposing an exceedingly heavy burden, (3) lacks elements of a
punitive statute, and (4) is enforced by the revenue service alone.452
A tax may be so punitive as to cease being a tax, and possibly violate
due process; even so, the precise point remains undecided and ought
to be addressed case by case.453 Congress, however, can tax
inactivity, which is economically identical to giving a tax preference
for an activity.454
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–95 (2012).
Id. at 2599–600; see Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause limits the taxation powers only to the
extent that a putative tax might violate due process if it amounts to a confiscation of
property or leads to such gross inequality as to amount to a taking); see also Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (holding that exemptions from a tax do
not violate due process or equal protection guarantees).
454. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
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If an exaction is a tax, it must be either direct or indirect. Direct
taxes consist of the following categories: capitations, taxes on real
and personal property, and income from property.455 In view of the
Sixteenth Amendment, only capitations and property taxes are
subject to apportionment by population, while income from property
is not.456 An income tax may be direct or indirect, depending on the
source of the income; income itself evades precise definition,
although it seems to presuppose some gain and realization of that
gain.457 However, income is treated as income at the point when its
amount becomes certain and definite.458 All taxes other than those
identified as direct are deemed indirect and include: business gross
receipts taxes,459 business profits taxes,460 gift taxes,461 social security
taxes,462 estate taxes,463 inheritance taxes,464 and generally any excises
on “particular us[es] or enjoyment[s] of property or shifting . . . of
any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of
property.”465
Duties, imposts, and excises, per the Uniformity Clause, must be
uniform throughout the United States. Generally, the Clause is
satisfied when a tax is levied in a geographically uniform way.466
Otherwise, the Clause is satisfied where the subject of the tax is
defined in non-geographic terms. However, it is not fatal to the tax’s
validity if the subject is defined in geographical terms, in which case
a court ought to scrutinize the classification to determine if there is
actual geographic discrimination.467
The Export Clause generally prohibits taxes on exports. The
following have been held to be impermissible export taxes: ad
455. Id. at 2598.
456. Id.
457. Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 569–70 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211–12
(1920); see also Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934) (holding
that a tax on the rental value of the part of a building occupied by the owner is a direct
tax not on income).
458. United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936).
459. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 411 (1904).
460. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911).
461. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929).
462. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578–79 (1937).
463. N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 348–49 (1921).
464. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81 (1900).
465. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945).
466. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 89. As discussed, supra note 18, the Uniformity Clause does
not extend to unincorporated territories of the United States.
467. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983).
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valorem taxes on the value of exported cargo;468 and taxes
(discriminatory or otherwise) falling on exports during the course of
exportation, including on services and activities closely related to the
export process469 or necessary incidents to it.470 On the other hand,
user fees affecting instrumentalities of exportation are permissible if
they are (1) not proportionate to the quantity or value of the good
exported, and (2) not excessive,471 for example, if they are fixed
administrative fees imposed on goods bound for export without
regard to quantity or value.472 Likewise, levies on pre-export goods
and services, along with those on various services and activities
tangentially related to the export process, are acceptable,473 as are
generally applicable taxes on income from exportation.474 Taxes on
goods carried from the incorporated United States to a territory are
not considered export taxes.475
III. DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR
CLASSIFYING TAXES
Having reviewed the Supreme Court’s case law on constitutional
taxation provisions, certain articulable patterns emerge. The power
of Congress to levy taxes (Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises) is
exceptionally broad.476 The definition of “taxes” in the Constitution
is similar to the vernacular understanding of the term—impositions
by the government to raise revenue.477 As the Court in National
Federation of Independent Business concluded, the threshold for
deeming an exaction a tax is quite easy to meet: it must raise some
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470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id.
United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 863 (1996).
Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 26–27 (1915).
United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 369 (1998).
Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375–76 (1875).
Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. at 850.
William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 174–75 (1918).
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 156–57 (1901).
See, e.g., Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581–82 (1937)
(observing that Congress has broad discretion to choose the subject matter of
taxation); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176–77 (1796) (opinion of
Paterson, J.) (noting that the term “taxes” is generic, covering all levies that could
conceivably be enacted, and vesting in Congress a plenary taxation authority).
477. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines “tax” as “a charge, usu. monetary, imposed by the
government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public revenue.
Most broadly, the term embraces all governmental impositions on the person,
property, privileges, occupations, and enjoyment of the people, and includes duties,
imposts, and excises.” (10th ed. 2014).
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revenue and not be entirely punitive.478 The courts will not speculate
on congressional motives in imposing a tax, nor will they question
the tax’s restrictive effects, so long as the exaction produces some
revenue, is not attended by “offensive regulation,” and operates as a
tax.479 In any case, taxes in the Constitution are divided into two
categories: direct and indirect.480 Direct taxes are expressly named,
and the existence of indirect taxes is implied from that reference by
negative implication.481 Notwithstanding Justice Chase’s assertion in
Hylton,482 it is quite unlikely that there can be a tax simultaneously
direct and indirect.483 By definition, the categories are mutually
exclusive and cover all types of taxes—there can be no tax that is
neither direct nor indirect.
A. Direct Taxes
Direct taxes fall into two broad categories: those that are subject to
apportionment and those that are exempt. From Hylton, the Court
has unequivocally considered capitations and real property taxes to
be direct.484 From Pollock, the Court has considered personal
property taxes and taxes on income from real and personal property
to be direct as well.485 Thus, for constitutional purposes, direct taxes
are: capitations, property taxes, and taxes on the income derived from
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–97 (2012).
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937).
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796).
Id.
Id. at 174 (“I believe some taxes may be both direct and indirect at the same time.”).
One might contend that an income tax that extends equally to wages and passive
income could be a tax that is both direct and indirect. Indeed, the Court in Pollock II
struck down the entire taxation statute, including the parts that were not held to be a
direct tax, as the law constituted “one entire scheme of taxation.” Pollock II, 158 U.S.
601, 637 (1895). However, such a law is best understood not as a single tax both
direct and indirect, but rather as several discrete taxes, some direct, others indirect,
that together constitute the regime. The question addressed in Pollock II was one of
severability, whether “the parts are wholly independent of each other,” and the Court
determined that if passive income was removed from taxation, then the tax burden
would fall too severely on wage and other active income. Id. at 635. The Court also
observed that a statute could lay a direct and an indirect tax, treating the two
components separately. Id. at 637 (“We do not mean to say that an act laying by
apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income
thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and
vocations.”).
484. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176.
485. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 637. See supra note 358 for a discussion of whether the
Sixteenth Amendment removed income taxes from the definition of direct tax.
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property. The Sixteenth Amendment exempts income taxes from
apportionment, but the other direct taxes are still subject to the rule.486
The only income taxes that would have been subject to
apportionment but for the Amendment are those on income from
property, today called passive income, including capital gains,
royalties, interest, dividends, rents, and the like.487 Only those taxes
levied on property purely because of ownership are deemed direct.488
Thus, levies that attach on sale, gift, death, or other action or event
are considered indirect. From here emerge the first two categories of
a constitutional model of taxation:
1. Direct taxes subject to apportionment: capitations and
property taxes.
2. Direct taxes exempt from apportionment: taxes on income
derived from property (i.e., passive income).
There is ambiguity about whether direct taxes exempt from
apportionment are also exempt from the uniformity requirement. It is
clear that direct taxes subject to apportionment need not be uniform,
as the apportionment process would necessarily entail non-uniform
application of taxes, with the possible exception of pure capitations
levied equally on each person. As to direct taxes exempt from
apportionment, the plain language of the Sixteenth Amendment, in
providing that taxes on income, regardless of source, need not be
apportioned, makes no reference to reclassifying direct income taxes
as indirect or to applying to them the requirements of the Uniformity

486. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
487. It is curious that taxes on income from property are considered direct, whereas taxes
imposed on individuals directly for income from their occupations are deemed
indirect. See Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895) (“We have considered the act only
in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal
property, [finding such taxes to be direct,] and have not commented on so much of it
as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the
instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the
guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such.”). The Sixteenth Amendment made
this idiosyncrasy moot for practical purposes, and today active income has greater
constitutional protection (it must be uniform) than does passive income (exempt from
apportionment and not subject to uniformity).
488. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (holding that property taxes are
direct when “imposed upon property simply because of its ownership”). The Court’s
expression of the idea of a direct tax is not the most accurate semantically. A tax is
not direct because the government imposes it because of ownership, but rather
because it attaches for no other reason than the taxpayer’s ownership of the property.
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Clause.489 On the other hand, one might argue that the drafters of the
Sixteenth Amendment would not have wished for Congress to
impose taxes on passive income that varied solely based on
geographical location, and in any case, the Court’s decision in
Brushaber to reclassify income taxes as indirect resolved the
question.490 The counter-argument is that, at least as to real property,
income from some property might merit different treatment because
of its location, although classifying property based on its location, if
applied uniformly throughout the United States (e.g., a tax on all
seaside real property), would likely comply with the Uniformity
Clause anyway. Moreover, the Court’s ambiguous approach in the
recently decided National Federation of Independent Business can be
interpreted as overruling Brushaber. On balance, the most likely
answer is that passive income is indeed exempt from both
apportionment and uniformity.491
Regardless, it would be
extraordinarily difficult, politically, to levy a truly non-uniform tax
on passive income, and such a tax might still be found
unconstitutional under some non-tax provision, such as the Fifth
Amendment’s due process protections.
B. Indirect Taxes
The counterpart to direct taxes is indirect taxes. Their existence is
implied negatively by the explicit references to direct taxes, and they
are best understood as being that which direct taxes are not.492 Thus,
only by having identified which taxes are direct can one define the
indirect variety. The Constitution expressly references four types of

489. See Morrow, supra note 21, at 412 (“If the Sixteenth Amendment is passed such a tax
[subject to neither the rule of uniformity nor apportionment] will have been
discovered.”).
490. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1916).
491. But see Jensen, supra note 16, at 2341–42 n.37 (arguing that, per Brushaber, “income
taxes must satisfy the uniformity rule”). It is unclear to what extent the holding in
Brushaber, that income taxes are indirect taxes given that a source inquiry is
prohibited, is still good law in the light of the ambiguity introduced by Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business, as discussed in
greater depth above. See supra note 332. In divining the Court’s mystical coans on
this topic, there is no clear answer—only speculation.
492. But see Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV.
280, 292 (1907) (“Indirect taxation is not . . . mentioned in the Constitution itself, and
nothing in the Constitution requires us to give it a legal definition. . . . The distinction
between direct and indirect taxation belongs, or belonged (if it is obsolete), to political
economy, not to law.”).
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indirect taxes: duties, imposts, excises, and export taxes.493 One can
dispose quickly of the latter, as the Constitution prohibits taxes on
exports.494 The other three types of enumerated indirect taxes,
however, have been sources of definitional consternation for some
time. Since Pacific Insurance Co., the Court repeatedly attempted to
define the terms, citing different definitions over the years. It hardly
helped that the Court appeared to use “duties” and “excises”
interchangeably, and, in upholding various indirect taxes, called them
“duties or excises.”495 Thus, in Pacific Insurance Co., duties were
“things due and recoverable by law” or by an alternative definition—
synonymous with customs; imposts were import taxes; and excises
were domestic taxes on the consumption of commodities or retail
sales.496 In Pollock II, duties were taxes on import, export, and
consumption; imposts were any indirect tax; and excises were taxes
on goods or licenses.497 In Patton v. Brady, excises were taxes levied
on articles intended for consumption and imposed between the
beginning of manufacture and final consumption.498 In Thomas v.
United States, the Court, in evident frustration, noted that duties,
imposts, and excises elude precise definition but are “used
comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties imposed on
importation, consumption, manufacture and sale of certain
commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations,
occupations and the like.”499 In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., the Court
defined duties and imposts as import and export levies, and excises as
taxes on manufacture, sale, and consumption, as well as occupational
license taxes and taxes on corporate privileges.500 The Court last
addressed the question in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, where it
observed that direct taxes, duties, imposts, and excises “include every
form of tax appropriate to sovereignty,” and that whether an indirect
tax is classified as a duty, impost, or excise is of minimal
493. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
494. Id. art I, § 9, cl. 5.
495. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900) (holding that an inheritance tax
was “a duty or excise”).
496. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 (1868).
497. Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 622 (1895). There was some ambiguity introduced in
Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 348 (1875), about whether occupational and
license fees were duties or excises or some other form of indirect tax, as Justice
Clifford there appeared to suggest in dicta that license fees might be separate from
duties, imposts, and excises, but later cases such as Pollock II referred to license fees
as excises. 158 U.S. at 656.
498. 184 U.S. 608, 617 (1902).
499. 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904).
500. 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911).
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importance.501 The Court did note that although there might be
indirect taxes that are not duties, imposts, or excises, their existence
remained undiscovered.502
Even though the Court apparently gave up on the task of precisely
defining duties, imposts, and excises, the definitions are nonetheless
important for developing a coherent view of federal taxation’s
boundaries. Black’s Law Dictionary crystallizes the definitions of
each of these three types of taxes well. A duty is defined as a “tax
imposed on a commodity or transaction, esp. on imports . . . . A duty
in this sense is imposed on things, not persons.”503 An impost is a
“tax or duty, esp. a customs duty.”504 An excise is a “tax imposed on
the manufacture, sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette tax), or on
an occupation or activity (such as a license tax or an attorney
occupation fee).”505 These definitions generally comport with the

501. 301 U.S. 548, 581–82 (1937).
502. Id. at 582.
503. Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Some taxes that bear the name
“duty” listed in the same category include accounts duties, ad valorem duties, customs
duties, death duties, and succession duties, among others. By comparison, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines “duty” as:
A payment to the public revenue levied upon the import, export,
manufacture, or sale of certain commodities, the transfer of or
succession to property, licence to use certain things or practise
certain trades or pursuits, or the legal recognition of deeds and
documents, as contracts, receipts, certificates, protests, affidavits,
etc. Applied to the payments included under the several heads of
customs, excise, licences, stamp-duties, probate and succession
duties (death duties), inhabited house duty. In general, ‘duties’
differ from other taxes in that they are levied upon specific
articles or transactions, and not upon persons whether by
capitation or in proportion to their income or possessions. But the
distinction is not strictly observed in language; a ‘window-tax’
and ‘dog-tax’ are duties, as much as the inhabited house duty, or
the duty on men-servants.
Duty, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989).
504. Impost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The Oxford English Dictionary
defines “impost” as:
A tax, duty, imposition, tribute; spec. a customs-duty levied on
merchandise. Now chiefly Hist. The distinction suggested by
Cowell, that impost properly denotes a duty on imported goods,
and custom one on goods exported, is repeated by later dicts.; but
there is no evidence that it was ever in accepted use.
Impost, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989).
505. Excise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The Oxford English Dictionary
defines “excise” as, generally, “[a]ny toll or tax,” and specifically:
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Court’s attempts to define these tax types.506 In sum, indirect taxes
can be defined as taxes on transactions, activities, or changes in
position. Thus, two more categories emerge for a taxation model:
3. Indirect taxes subject to uniformity: duties, imposts, and
excises.
4. Indirect taxes prohibited: export taxes.
Were one to conclude here, however, the model would remain
incomplete. As mentioned, there are direct taxes and indirect taxes,
and these two mutually exclusive categories cover all conceivable
taxes. The Constitution provides that all direct taxes (except those on

A duty charged on home goods, either in the process of their
manufacture or before their sale to the home consumers” (Encycl.
Brit.). In England this kind of taxation was first adopted in 1643,
in acknowledged imitation of the example of Holland. . . . The
taxes levied under the name of Excise by the Ordinance of 1643
included certain duties imposed, in addition to the customs, on
various foreign products; it was not until the 19th century that the
actual use of the word became strictly conformed to the preceding
definition.
Excise, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989).
506. The Court’s definitions may have deviated significantly from what an original
understanding of the terms implied. See Whitney, supra note 490, at 293:
In Great Britain the words ‘tax’ and ‘duty’ had had legal
definitions for a century, exclusive of each other, settled and
unvarying in their statutory use. A tax was laid upon all property,
or upon all real property, at a valuation, and always by a rule of
apportionment. The only ‘tax’ in actual use was the general land
tax. Everything that was not a tax in this restricted sense was a
duty. No duties were laid by any system of apportionment. All
were laid by a rule of uniformity. This unvarying distinction in
terms in the statute book cannot have been accidental, and must
have been familiar to lawyers.
The same commentator also proposed treating capitations as a separate category apart
from direct taxes, id. at 280, and that direct taxes “would be the general property taxes
laid according to a general valuation, while [duties, imposts, and excises] would
include those on specific property, together with stamp duties, license duties, business
duties, and duties on salaries and pensions,” and “[t]axes invented in the future (and
the general income tax is one of these) would be left to be classified in the future[,]”
id. at 296.
For another view, see Johnson, supra note 44, at 300: “‘Impost’ was a reference to a
tax on imports, now more commonly called ‘tariffs’ or ‘custom duties.’ ‘Duty’ was
apparently a reference to a stamp tax on legal documents. ‘Excise tax’ referred,
originally but not exclusively, to tax on whiskey.”
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income) must be apportioned.507 However, in setting the uniformity
rule, the Constitution does not apply it to all indirect taxes; rather, the
rule applies only to duties, imposts, and excises. The interpretational
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (meaning “the
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others”) suggests
that a non-exhaustive list of things enumerated presupposes
something not enumerated.508 Indeed, Justice Chase, in his Hylton
opinion, observed that “[i]f the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate other taxes than direct taxes, and duties, imposts, and
excises, there is great inaccuracy in their language. If these four
species of taxes were all that were meditated, the general power to
lay taxes was unnecessary.”509 This leaves us with a fifth and final
category in the model:
5. Indirect taxes exempt from uniformity.
The one example of such a tax is one that predates the Constitution
itself and has not been levied since America’s current governing
document took effect: requisitions.510 Requisitions were the primary
507. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
508. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (Thomson/West ed. 2012) (calling the doctrine the “negativeimplication canon”).
509. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1793) (opinion of Chase, J.); see
also Jensen, supra note 21, at 712 (“It is not a new idea that some taxes might be
immune from both the apportionment requirement and the uniformity rule.”); but see
Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895) (“Although there have been from time to time
intimations that there might be some tax which was not a direct tax nor included under
the words ‘duties, imposts and excises,’ such a tax for more than 100 years of national
existence has as yet remained undiscovered . . . .”).
510. One might question whether requisitions could be levied constitutionally. If Congress
were careful in crafting a requisition law to avoid Tenth Amendment commandeering
concerns and intergovernmental tax immunity issues (which might not be easy, since
the anti-commandeering rule prevents Congress from forcing a state to use its political
process to follow federal dictate, while intergovernmental tax immunity prevents
Congress from levying a tax directly on the sovereign operations of a state (and vice
versa)), cf., e.g., Rob Gunning, Into and Out of the Bog: The Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity Doctrine, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 151, 151 (2005); William D. Marsh,
Note, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Beyond South Carolina v. Baker, 13 BYU L.
REV. 249, 259–60 (1989), it would appear that on balance requisitions would be
allowable, especially given the Court’s reticence over the past century to strike down
taxes. Compare Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1957, 1988–89 (1993) (“[The Constitution] was not conditioned on the
continued futility of requisitions . . . . Today, under an originalist analysis . . . the
federal government may not reclaim that discarded instrument now that it might prove
more efficacious.”), with Strahilevitz, supra note 31, at 918 (“[I]t seems highly likely
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way by which the Articles of Confederation contemplated the federal
government would raise revenue.511 Under that system, the Congress
of the Confederation determined the amount of revenue needed for
national purposes and required each state to supply the fraction of the
total sum relative to the value of real property (land and buildings and
improvements) within that state, by such valuation method as the
Congress determined.512
A requisition scheme would almost certainly be deemed a tax, as it
would raise revenue and not be punitive in its intent or operation.513
Moreover, since it would be imposed neither on individual taxpayers,
nor on property directly (it need not be measured based on property at
all), it would not be a direct tax.514 And referring to the definitions of
the specifically enumerated indirect taxes discussed above, it is clear
that a requisition is not a duty, impost, or excise.

511.
512.
513.

514.

that requisitions were considered the paradigmatic examples of ‘indirect taxes’
specifically authorized by the Constitution.”); Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen,
Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the Federal Requisition Power: New
York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 379 (1998) (“[T]here is
substantial evidence that the Constitution left intact the federal government’s power to
impose requisitions on the states.”); see also Jensen, supra note 16, at 2400–01 (“But
whether or not requisitions are permitted under the existing constitutional scheme,
they have not been attempted.”).
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII.
Id.
See Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 845–46 (2009) (“It is probable
that ‘requisitions’ on states are included within ‘Taxes,’ although the issue has never
squarely arisen (as no requisition has been enacted by Congress under the
Constitution).”).
Some commentators have argued that a requisition would be a direct tax. See id. at
841 (“[T]he category of ‘direct tax’ (subject to the apportionment requirement) is
limited to requisitions, capitation taxes, and taxes on tangible property.”). However,
this position erroneously conflates “direct taxes” with “taxes that are capable of being
apportioned,” an apparent misreading of Justice Iredell’s argument in Hylton. Cf.
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“As
all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution contemplated
none as direct but such as could be apportioned.”). While it may be true that all direct
taxes must be taxes capable of being apportioned, it does not follow that all taxes that
are capable of being apportioned are direct. Although a requisition can indeed be
apportioned based on population, it is not a direct tax, at least so far as the Supreme
Court has interpreted the term. See also Jensen, supra note 16, at 2338 (“[M]any
founders distinguished a direct-tax regime from the ineffective requisitions process
used under the Articles of Confederation: Congress issued requisitions for revenue to
the states, and each state could determine how . . . its obligation would be satisfied.
Direct taxes are instead imposed by the national government directly on individual
taxpayers.”).
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In Hylton, Justices Paterson and Iredell suggested in dicta that if
there were to be a tax which was indirect but not a duty, impost, or
excise, then it would nonetheless be subject to uniformity.515 Justice
Chase disagreed—and was correct in doing so.516 It is hard to
conceive how a requisition could be applied geographically
uniformly, as the Uniformity Clause requires geographical uniformity
not just among the states but within them as well.517 Whether a
requisition were allocated today based on property value or some
other metric, except perhaps on a per-head basis, it cannot be uniform
throughout the United States.
While it might be applied
geographically uniformly as between the states themselves, the
operation of the requisition within the states would not be uniform;
which is what is required to satisfy the Uniformity Clause. For
example, if a requisition scheme were imposed, taking as the basis of
allocation the value of non-federally-owned real property in the
states, and if the states passed the cost of the tax down to the property
owners, due to inherent differences in population densities and
property values among the states, the burden would not be borne on a
geographically uniform basis. In other words, two otherwise equally
situated property owners might well bear different tax burdens, solely
because of their residence (i.e., geographical location). All of this is
not to say that a requisition could be arbitrarily imposed in varying
amounts on different states. Even if the apportionment and
uniformity rules do not present an obstacle, the law must still
conform to constitutional due process constraints.
515. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“There may, perhaps, be an
indirect tax on a particular article, that cannot be comprehended within the description
of duties, or imposts, or excises; in such case it will be comprised under the general
denomination of taxes. . . . The question occurs, how is such tax to be laid, uniformly
or apportionately? The rule of uniformity will apply, because it is an indirect tax, and
direct taxes only are to be apportioned.”); Id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“If it can
be considered as a tax, neither direct within the meaning of the Constitution, nor
comprehended within the term duty, impost or excise; there is no provision in the
Constitution, one way or another, and then it must be left to such an operation of the
power, as if the authority to lay taxes had been given generally in all instances,
without saying whether they should be apportioned or uniform; and in that case, I
should presume, the tax ought to be uniform; because the present Constitution was
particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases
specified . . . .”).
516. Id. at 173 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“If there are any other species of taxes that are not
direct, and not included within the words duties, imposts, or excises, they may be laid
by the rule of uniformity, or not; as Congress shall think proper and reasonable.”).
517. Contra Strahilevitz, supra note 31, at 918 (“As long as Congress applied the same
formula to all states, a requisition would be a constitutional [uniform] indirect tax.”).
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In brief summary, to present in one place the five-part model that
emerges from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on taxation, there
are:
1. Direct taxes subject to apportionment: capitations and
property taxes.
2. Direct taxes exempt from apportionment: taxes on income
derived from property (i.e., passive income).
3. Indirect taxes subject to uniformity: duties, imposts, and
excises.
4. Indirect taxes prohibited: export taxes.
5. Indirect taxes exempt from uniformity.
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
“O brave new world, / That has such taxes in’t!”518
As government expenditures continue to outpace revenues, many
have pushed to expand the intake. To that effect, a variety of
additional taxes have been proposed or discussed in academic
literature on the subject, the most prominent of which are addressed
here and classified by the five-part model distilled in the previous
section, as examples of the model’s practical application. The
proposed taxes were selected based on their novelty, and at least in
the case of the last two, their singular creativity. The analyses that
follow are brief and represent the author’s thoughts on the
appropriate categorization of these taxes, in the light of the lengthier
reflections above.
A. Federal Consumption Tax
Sales taxes are ubiquitous in the United States, levied by the
overwhelming majority of American state governments.519 The
federal government, however, has never imposed a broadly based
518. As Shakespeare’s Miranda might say were she a tax lawyer. Cf. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1 (Rev. ed., Yale Univ. Press 1955); but see
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2
(Tucker Brooke ed., Yale Univ. Press 1923) (“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the
lawyers.”).
519. Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2014, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 18,
2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2014.
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consumption tax. With revenues projected to become a major
problem for the United States, various consumption tax ideas have
been floated. These include instituting a value-added tax (VAT),520 a
type of tax already imposed by many countries, as well as more
arcane proposals, such as the flat521 and the unlimited savings
allowance taxes.522 A federal sales or VAT-type tax would clearly
fall into the category of duties, imposts, and excises, as it would be
imposed on transactions and would be levied indirectly.523 It would
therefore be a third-category tax, an indirect tax subject to uniformity.
Some other proposed taxes, such as the flat and the unlimited
savings allowance taxes are somewhat more complicated.524 The
basic idea of both is that an individual must pay taxes on his annual
income, with the income reduced by the amount saved that year (it is
thus the inverse of a wealth tax). For businesses, the calculation is
similar, except that they offset their income by investments made.
The end result is that the taxpayer is taxed on his consumption. The
classification of these taxes is not readily apparent. Since they appear
to have qualities of both direct and indirect taxes, they have been
called “direct-consumption taxes.”525 So far as these taxes are levied
on passive income, they are indeed direct,526 but fall into the category
520. See generally The VAT Reader: What a Federal Consumption Tax Would Mean for
America, TAX ANALYSTS (2011), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files
/VATReader.pdf/$file/VATReader.pdf (a collection of articles arguing for the
imposition of a VAT in addition to the income tax); Americans for Fair Taxation,
How FAIRtax Works: Your Money, Your Decision, FAIRTAX.ORG (2014),
https://fairtax.org/about/how-fairtax-works (arguing for the wholesale replacement of
the income tax by a consumption tax).
521. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 84 (2d ed. 1995). This proposal
is not to be confused with the flat income tax that has been mooted in recent years.
E.g., Jeanne Sahadi, Rand Paul’s Hopes for a Flat Tax, CNN MONEY (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/pf/taxes/rand-paul-flat-tax/.
522. Proposed by legislators and described in brief by Professors Zelenak and Jensen in
their respective articles. Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution,
and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833–36 (1999); Jensen,
supra note 16, at 2402–05.
523. But see Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 521 (1899) (observing in dicta that “a tax upon
every sale made in any place” would be a tax on property and so direct).
524. See Jensen, supra note 16, at 2403–04 (concluding that other proposed taxes, such as
the flat and the unlimited savings allowance taxes, are somewhat more complicated).
525. Id. at 2407.
526. Cf. Zelenak, supra note 522, at 842 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s understanding,
expressed in the Pollock opinion of 1895, [is] that a tax imposed solely on earned
income is not a direct tax. . . . the tax on earned income was invalidated only because
the Court viewed it as not severable from the unapportioned direct tax on income from
property.”).
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of income taxes. These direct-consumption taxes effectively tax only
the portion of income spent on consumption; nonetheless, it cannot
be denied that they do tax income.527 The starting point for
calculating the amount of tax due is income earned for the year.
Even when reduced by the amount of savings or investments, the
remainder is still properly characterized as income.528 It has become
axiomatic in tax law that “every deduction from gross income is
allowed as a matter of legislative grace.”529 That Congress decided to
allow a deduction for savings, as opposed to any one of the panoply
of current deductions and offsets, does not change the character of the
thing taxed.530 These unusual income taxes, to the extent they fall on
passive income, would land in the second category—direct taxes
exempt from apportionment; the remainder would be placed in the
third—indirect taxes subject to uniformity.
B. Federal Property Tax
Today, all states tax real estate and many tax some personal
property on an ad valorem basis.531 These taxes are, in addition to
capitations, the quintessential direct taxes. Unlike the federal
government, the states do not have any federal constitutional
restrictions on their ability to levy direct taxes. Should the federal
government attempt to tax real or personal property based on its
value, such as by instituting a national real property tax, it would
have to apportion it as required by the Constitution.532 Arguments
that a federal ad valorem property tax is an income tax on the yield
from property are unpersuasive, especially as an income tax is
substantially “a tax on economic outcomes,” requiring some form of
realization, a feature lacking in a property tax.533 A federal property
tax would fall into the first category of the model—direct taxes
subject to apportionment.

527. But see Jensen, supra note 16, at 2408–09.
528. See Zelenak, supra note 522, at 846 (arguing that “excluding saved income from the
tax base” is not “inconsistent with an income tax”).
529. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938).
530. Even if the tax were to be considered a non-income tax, it would only invalidate any
portion of the tax that was on passive income and not apportioned (unless the directtax component was not severable from the indirect-tax part). The remainder,
including that on wages, would be characterized as an indirect tax, subject to
uniformity.
531. See Dodge, supra note 513, at 929–31.
532. See Berg, supra note 22, at 211.
533. See Dodge, supra note 513, at 932.
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C. Wealth Tax
In recent years, the idea of a national wealth tax has found
traction.534 In its several variants, ultimately such a tax would fall
upon the wealth owned by individuals, including real property,
tangible and intangible personal property, and cash. So far as the
wealth tax included in its base real and personal property, it would be
direct for the same reason that a federal property tax would be
direct.535 Such a tax is not an excise on the privilege of holding
property,536 as an excise on a privilege implies “discrete positive-law
benefits conferred by government,” or at least some action or change
in position to which the excise would attach.537 Here, the tax would
be levied on property simply because of its ownership.538 Again, this
would be a quintessential example of a first-category tax—a direct
tax subject to apportionment.
D. Mark-to-Market Tax
A mark-to-market tax on publicly traded securities, like its more
broadly based cousin, the wealth tax, has also found its advocates.539
This proposal involves taxing the increases in the value of publicly

534. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 95 (Yale
Univ. Press 1999); Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock: The Constitutionality of
Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723, 1724 (2002); Deborah H.
Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 424 (2000);
Ackerman, supra note 20, at 56–58 (arguing for a federal wealth tax); but see Erik M.
Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 822 (2003); Erik
M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and The Meaning of
‘Incomes’, 97 TAX NOTES 99, 99–100 (2002).
535. See Berg, supra note 22, at 211–12.
536. Contra Richard W. Lindholm, The Constitutionality of a Federal Net Wealth Tax: A
Socioeconomic Analysis of a Strategy Aimed at Ending the Under-Taxation of Land,
43 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 451, 454 (1984) (arguing that an unapportioned wealth tax
would be constitutional because the Court could separate the measure of the tax from
its base, but that to be safe, it would be best to exclude land from the wealth tax base).
537. Dodge, supra note 513, at 933–34.
538. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 597–98 (1881) (noting Alexander
Hamilton’s observation that taxes levied on the whole property of individuals or upon
their entire real or personal estate are direct).
539. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can Marking Stock to Market
Replace the Corporate Tax?, 143 TAX NOTES 139 (2014) (describing a proposal to
replace the corporate income tax with a mark-to-market tax on publicly traded stocks);
David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 109 TAX NOTES
1047 (2005) (proposing a progressive mark-to-market tax on publicly traded property
and derivatives).
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traded stock at regular intervals without regard to realization.540 In its
typical form, this proposal extends only to publicly traded property,
presumably because of easier monitoring and valuation.541 Since a
broadly based mark-to-market tax on unrealized capital gains would
attach to personal property held by an individual simply because of
his ownership of that property, it would be direct. Moreover, because
there is no realization involved, it cannot be an income tax exempt
from apportionment. Granted, there are already limited mark-tomarket regimes for dealers in securities,542 for futures contracts and
options,543 and an exit tax on the property of certain expatriates,544
none of which have run into fatal challenges in the courts. However,
these particular cases can be differentiated, as they involve either
something more than the passive holding of securities or some
change in position justifying what can effectively be deemed excise
tax regimes.545 Accordingly, a mark-to-market tax would be, like the
wealth tax, a first-category direct tax subject to apportionment.
E. Requisition Tax
Conceived as a possible replacement for the federal income tax, a
requisition tax would resurrect the taxation regime in place before the
Constitution went into effect.546 Under this proposal, the federal
government would create a formula determining each state’s fiscal
obligations to the national treasury.547 The formula might be based
on the relative share of total national income earned in the aggregate
by a state’s residents,548 or any other rationally based rule. Each state
would then collect the assigned sum from its residents in whatever
way it deems most appropriate.549 As discussed in the previous part,

540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

546.
547.
548.
549.

See Miller, supra note 539, at 1067.
Id. at 1053.
I.R.C. § 475 (2012).
I.R.C. § 1256 (2012).
I.R.C. § 877A (2012). The exit tax has not gone unchallenged in commentary,
however. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 322, at 214.
The author has addressed this question, as well as the constitutionality of a broadly
based mark-to-market tax generally, in an earlier article. See Gene Magidenko, Is a
Broadly Based Mark-to-Market Tax Unconstitutional?, 143 TAX NOTES 952 (2014).
See Strahilevitz, supra note 321, at 923–25.
Id. at 923–24.
Id. at 924.
Different states would presumably have different ideas about how best to assign the
burden and collection of the tax, thereby functioning as “laboratories of democracy.”
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single

2015

Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes

129

since a requisition is not imposed directly on individuals or
property—and it is not a duty, an impost, or an excise—it would be
the prime example of a fifth-category indirect tax exempt from
uniformity.
F. Imputed Income Tax
The idea of a tax on imputed income has arisen in at least some
quarters. “[I]mputed income” is “the rental value of an asset owned
by the taxpayer that is held for personal use.”550 Such a tax could be
measured, for example, by a levy on the amount of rent that a
homeowner would expect to receive by renting out his home instead
of living in it. Although such a tax might appear to have the
characteristics of both an excise (as a tax on the ostensible “use” of a
home) and a property tax (a tax on property because of its
ownership),551 in substance it cannot be anything but a property tax.
The rental value of property is often intimately linked to the
property’s actual value. In a case where the income is only
hypothetical and where the value of a tax is determined with
reference to the property’s value, this tax falls again into the first
category—a direct tax subject to apportionment.552
G. Personal Endowment Tax
In the world of zany tax ideas, a personal endowment tax probably
takes the prize. It is “a tax on a person’s human capital, or wageearning capacity. . . . a tax on income-producing potential, as

courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
The difficulty with a requisition tax today recalls the country’s experience under the
old Articles of Confederation—how is it to be enforced? If a state refuses to comply,
the federal government could try, for example, to levy payroll or income taxes directly
on the citizens of the recalcitrant state, a power not available when requisitions were
last attempted. Strahilevitz, supra note 321, at 925. Since the federal government’s
ability to coerce the states is limited, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.”), taxing individuals directly may be less constitutionally
objectionable than most alternative enforcement mechanisms, though it is by no
means free from doubt. See supra note 358.
550. Dodge, supra note 513, at 934.
551. Id. at 935–36.
552. See Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378–381 (1934) (holding that a
tax on the rental value of the part of a building occupied by the owner is direct and not
on income).
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opposed to economic uses or outcomes.”553 It would presumably be
measured by factors such as innate ability (genetics), education, and
family status. At first glance, this tax seems akin to a capitation, as in
some respects it is a levy on simply existing, measured by one’s
“human capital.” It is not unlike a property tax imposed on
unrealized value, which as noted above is direct. Yet human capital
is not capital in the tax sense. Any wages that might be paid in
compensation for one’s labor, or income derived from labor, at least
for constitutional purposes, are indirect.554 If such a tax were to be
found otherwise constitutionally acceptable, surely a very doubtful
assumption,555 it would probably fall into the fifth category of indirect
taxes exempt from uniformity. It is an indirect tax because it is
derived from potential human labor, but since it does not attach due
to a transaction, activity, or change in position, it cannot be deemed a
duty, impost, or excise.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
At the risk of stating the obvious, tax reform is a very thorny
matter. As time passes and the national government’s fiscal deficits
continue, tax reform will loom ever more urgently. Although there
are systemic obstacles to substantively changing the tax code, given
the status quo, it is hard to suppose that new taxes will not be
imposed in the future—the question seems one of timing more than
anything else. America’s system of governance allows for great
latitude in federal taxation, and this discretion makes wise decisionmaking at the helm vital.556 To that end, this Article has presented a
model to facilitate lucid thought about taxes as integrated facets of
the constitutional regime.
As lawmakers and commentators
contemplate taxation, they will find it helpful to consider not just the
particulars but also how those particulars fit into the larger picture.
553. Dodge, supra note 513, at 938.
554. See supra note 488 and accompanying text.
555. For one, such a tax would effectively force someone to work against his will, quite
possibly in a job he dislikes, raising serious equity concerns. See Dodge, supra note
513, at 939 n.433. In addition, since this tax could not be readily avoided (as can a
property tax by disposing of property, for example), it would almost certainly run
afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”).
556. As John Adams wrote the day after (what has become) tax day: “[P]ublic Virtue is the
only Foundation of Republics. There must be a positive Passion for the public good .
. . .” Letter of John Adams to Mercy Warren (Apr. 16, 1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 670 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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Analysis that extends to only the specific or only the abstract is
narrow and unlikely to lead to precise thought and well-reasoned
decisions. Balancing particularity with abstraction, the model of
taxation outlined here, derived from Supreme Court jurisprudence
and informed by historical practice and experience, provides a
conceptual framework for scrutinizing taxes and understanding how
they fit into the constitutional design.
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